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1. Article 7 – Voluntary Departure1 
Directive 2008/115,
2
 also known as the Return Directive (RD), sets out the procedure to be 
followed by Member States when returning illegally staying third-country nationals (TCNs), including 
the order in which the various, successive stages of that procedure should take place.
3
 According to 
Article 6(1) RD, the return procedure starts with an obligation for the Member States to issue a return 
decision against any irregular TCN. This return decision should contain a period ranging between 
seven and thirty days during which the irregular TCNs can independently organise their departure 
(Articles 7(1) RD). Member States have an obligation to grant this period for voluntary departure 
(VD) before taking any measure to carry out forced return.  
The initial period for voluntary departure can be extended, where necessary, by taking individual 
cases into account, such as: ‘the length of stay, the existence of children attending school and the 
existence of other family and social links.’ (Article 7(2) RD) According to paragraphs three and four 
of Article 7, the right of an irregular TCN to depart voluntary to his/her target country can be limited 
only in precise circumstances, which have to be strictly interpreted. In the case of ‘risk of absconding’, 
the Member States may, first, require the addressee of a return decision to fulfil one or more of the 
following obligations: report regularly to the authorities, deposit an adequate financial guarantee, 
submit documents or stay at a certain place (Article 7(3) RD). As a last resort, the irregular TCN can 
receive a period shorter than seven days for voluntary departure or even be refused the period 
altogether in limited circumstances (Article 7(4) RD). Shortening the voluntary departure period or not 
offering that option can be taken by the Member States if: there is a risk of absconding, there have 
been abusive applications by the TCN (i.e. an application for a legal stay has been dismissed as 
manifestly unfounded or fraudulent); if the TCN poses societal risks, that is he represents a threat to 
public policy, public security or national security. 
The aim of this section is to offer a comparative overview of the national jurisprudence dealing 
with issues related to the interpretation and application of Article 7 RD. The present synthesis is based 
primarily on jurisprudence originating from eleven Member States,
4
 which have been selected on the 
basis of the number and complexity of cases dealing with Articles 7-11 RD. 
The section unfolds in four parts following the four paragraph structure of Article 7 RD, and also the 
rationale of the Directive as highlighted by the CJEU, namely of the gradual unfolding of return 
measures,
5
 ranging from the least restrictive to the TCNs freedom (voluntary departure) to the last resort 
return measures (refusal of VD in the case of Article 7 RD, or detention for the overall return procedure). 
1.1 European and national jurisprudence 
Most of the national Reports highlighted that, in practice, very few return decisions/removal orders 
reach national courts for judicial review of their lawfulness regarding voluntary departure. The REDIAL 
database includes, to date, 66 national judgments on the interpretation and application of Article 7 RD 
from seventeen Member States.
6
 These judgments come from national courts of different levels of 
jurisdictions, ranging from first instance to highest national courts, dealing mostly with the lawfulness, 
                                                          
1 This chapter (Article 7 RD) was drafted by Dr. Madalina Moraru. 
2 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third country nationals, OJ L 348/98, 24.12.2008. 
3 On the same view, see CJEU judgment in El Dridi, para. 34. 
4 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Germany, France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain, available 
on: http://euredial.eu/publications/national-synthesis-reports/. 
5 See the CJEU judgment in the El Dridi case. 
6 Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Croatia, Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, 
France, Slovenia, Malta, Croatia and Spain. 
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soundness and/or proportionality of the refusal to grant voluntary departure, requests of prolongation of 
voluntary departure and alternatives to refusal to grant voluntary departure, and detention. Detained 
TCNs often argue that the administrative authority failed to adequately assess the possibility of imposing 
available alternatives prior to ordering detention. Administrative courts then focus on assessing whether 
the imposition of certain obligations might have resulted in obstructing of the return decision (for 
instance by way of the TCN abscond from the return and public authorities).  
Issues related to VD can also be found in the judgments uploaded under Article 8 VD, due to the 
fact that some of the Member States have a one-step return procedure, whereby return and removal 
decisions are merged into one single decision. TCNs usually challenge the order to leave the territory 
of the Member State (removal) and not just the VD (e.g. Belgium). 
The jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR has, so far, not particularly dealt with the issue of 
the nature and the procedure of the voluntary departure of irregular TCNs. Only recently, the CJEU 
was asked to clarify certain key concepts related to the VD measure, such as: the mandatory nature of 
the voluntary departure when none of the exceptions provided in Article 7(3) and (4) apply 
(Zaizoune)
7
 and the definition of the concept of a ‘risk to public policy’, as grounds for refusing 
voluntary departure (Z.Zh. And O.)
8
 The implications of these recent judgments of the CJEU on the 
application of Article 7 RD will be discussed in detail in the following sections. 
1.2 Paragraph 1
9
 – Voluntary departure – nature, procedure and period 
1.2.1 The position of voluntary departure in the return procedure 
According to Article 6(1) of the Return Directive (RD) and the CJEU jurisprudence,
10
 the return of 
the irregular TCN should begin with a return decision. According to the structure of the Directive and 
the settled CJEU case law,
11
 Member States should give priority to the voluntary departure of irregular 
TCNs against removal or other forced/coercive return measures. As held by the CJEU and its 
Advocates Generals, the entire return procedure should be governed by the EU principle of 
proportionality. To that end, as a rule, national authorities are obliged to consider conferring the TCN 
the option of voluntary departure to his country of origin. Only if voluntary departure is not possible or 
if it is unsuccessful, can the national authorities order the removal, i.e. the enforcement of the 
obligations to return by physical transportation out of the Member State. In practice the issue of the 
return decision is closely linked to the conferral of voluntary departure. This is so, because according 
to the Directive definition of voluntary departure (VD),
12
 the obligation to voluntary depart within a 
time limit is fixed in the return decision. Therefore, VD does not have an independent procedural 
                                                          
7 C-38/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:260, case commented in the REDIAL blog, http://euredial.eu/blog/. 
8 C-554/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:377, case commented in the REDIAL blog, http://euredial.eu/blog/.  
9 Article 7(1) of the Return Directive reads as follows: ‘A return decision shall provide for an appropriate period for 
voluntary departure of between seven and thirty days, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 
4. Member States may provide in their national legislation that such a period shall be granted only following an 
application by the third-country national concerned. In such a case, Member States shall inform the third-country 
nationals concerned of the possibility of submitting such an application. The time period provided for in the first 
subparagraph shall not exclude the possibility for the third-country nationals concerned to leave earlier.’ 
10 Zaizoune, C-38/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:260. 
11 See in particular, El Dridi (C-61/11 PPU) ECLI:EU:C:2011:268; Achughbabian (C-329/11) ECLI:EU:C:2011:807; Sagor 
(C-430/11) ECLI:EU:C:2012:777; Case Zh. and O. (C-554/13) ECLI:EU:C:2015:377; Case Zaizoune (C-38/14) 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:260. 
12 Article 3(6) RD. 
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status, but it forms an integral part of the return decision or the removal order.
13
 Consequently, TCNs’ 
complaints regarding VD usually imply challenging the return decision or the removal order. 
This ancillary nature of the VD has, in practice, created problems. This is due to the Member States 
specific implementing legislative frameworks or the specific judicial interpretation of the 
administrative practices. 
For instance, in Spain, the concept of a return decision as such does not exist. The return procedure 
for irregular TCNs breaks down into two: the ordinary procedure (procedimiento ordinario), and the 
urgent procedure (procedimiento preferente). Voluntary departure is a possibility for a TCN to return 
to his country of origin only in the case of the first procedure.
14
 Until recently, the main problem of the 
Spanish legal and jurisprudential framework has been the insufficient transposition of the Return 
Directive, due to the fact that the general sanction applied to a TCN staying irregularly on Spanish 
territory was a fine or, when other negative factors were concurrent, expulsion, and not primarily the 
return decision.
15
 Between 2005 and 2008, the Spanish Supreme Court established a specific 
interpretation of Article 57(1) of the Spanish Immigration Act 4/2000 (on sanctions for illegally 
staying TCNs). This interpretation meant that a fine is to be the main sanction in these cases, and that 
only when there are other negative factors to the mere illegal stay – and taking into account the 
principle of proportionality – should removal (expulsión) be the appropriate sanction. Though the 
Immigration Act 4/2000 has been modified several times, the provision on the general character of the 
fine has not been changed. The position of the Supreme Court on the so-called ‘doctrine of the fine’ 
has not changed until 2013. 
According to the current Spanish legislation, every denial of residence permit includes the demand 
that the TCN depart within fifteen days. Therefore illegally staying TCNs are not issued a return 
decision as such. Instead the refusal to grant or prolong a residence permit includes an obligation to 
voluntary depart within fifteen days.
16
 A TCN identified for the first time as being irregularly staying 
in the country for the first time, with no other negative circumstances being identified in relation to its 
irregular stay, was issued a financial sanction. This fine sanction was commonly applied instead of the 
expulsion order until the Zaizoune judgment of the CJEU. If a TCN was identified as being irregular 
for the first time and if there were other negative facts, he or she would have been expelled.
17
 This 
particular legislative framework has led, in practice, to the jurisprudential ‘doctrine of fine’,18 whereby 
the non-compliance of the TCN with the obligation to voluntary depart within fifteen days was 
punished with a fine alone.  
The national legal framework and jurisprudence created confusion as regards the existence or not, in 
the Spanish law, of a ‘return decision’. There was also confusion as to whether a ‘voluntary departure’ 
measure could be implied to exist from the administrative decision refusing a TCN residence or an 
extension of the residence permit. The conformity of the particular ‘doctrine of fine’ with the RD came 
up before the Spanish Supreme Court with the occasion of a direct appeal by a number of NGOs. They 
                                                          
13 For those Member States that have a one-step procedure, voluntary departure can be part of the removal order. More details 
on the difference between one-step and two-step procedures, and the Member States that choose one or another of these 
return procedure, see the section dedicated to Article 8 – Removal. 
14 See, REDIAL National Report for Spain, p. 2. 
15 The Supreme Court has broadly repeated that: ‘[…] illegal stay of TCN is to be sanctioned with a fine, and only when other 
negative factors are concurrent, will the appropriate sanction be the expulsion from national territory.’ (see, inter alia, 
Supreme Court decisions from 28 November 2008, Rec. 9581/2003; 9 January 2008, Rec. 5245/2004 and 19 July 2007, 
Rec. 1815/2004. For more details, please see the Spanish Report, p. 3. 
16 See Art. 57(1) of the Spanish Immigration Act 4/2000 and Article 24, 1 and 2 of Royal Decree 557/2011. 
17 For instance, the TCN had not paid the fine sanction. 
18 Supreme Court 30 June 2006; 31 October 2006, 29 March 2007); on grounds of having being detained for participation in a 
crime (see, Supreme Court, 19 December 2006) ; when not proving accommodation and family roots in Spain (Supreme 
Court, 28 February 2007) and having an entry ban in the Schengen Area (Supreme Court, 4 October 2007). See more 
details, in the Spanish Report, p. 4-5. 
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were challenging several provisions of the Royal Decree 557/2011 as being contrary to the Return 
Directive.
19
 The Spanish Supreme Court found these provisions to be incompatible with the RD, and 
required national courts to follow the EU return procedure which strictly required the Member States to 
sanction the TCNs illegally present in the country with a return decision.  
This ground-breaking judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court, setting aside the particular domestic 
legal model of sanctioning irregular TCNs in favour of the EU model of returning irregular TCNs, was 
not followed by all national courts. In the context of divergent jurisprudential opinions, a regional 
court (the High Court of the Basque county) sought to put an end to the jurisprudential debate, by 
sending a preliminary reference to the CJEU. The referring national court essentially asked the CJEU 
to decide whether Articles 4, 6(1) and 8(1) of the RD preclude Spanish legislation and the case law 
interpreting it (also known as ‘the doctrine of fine’) which make irregular TCNs subject to either a 
fine, or depending on the circumstances, a removal order.
20
  
It has to be noted that the legal interpretation of the Spanish provisions given by the referring Court 
would later be challenged by the Spanish Bar Association as being erroneous, while the preliminary 
reference was pending before the CJEU.
21
 The Association argued that the referring Court did not 
accurately describe the Spanish legal context. It argues that the Spanish legislation can be interpreted 
as implicitly including an equivalent return decision and a voluntary departure measure based on the 
obligations attached to the decisions refusing conferral or prolongation of the residence permit. This 
raises the issue of the extent of detail that national courts have to give as regards the national legal 
context, in their preliminary reference. This case shows that it might prove useful to provide to the 
CJEU not only the description of national legislation, but also the different domestic jurisprudential 
views or conflicts, so that the Court of Justice can take an informed decision on the appropriate 
interpretation of EU law provisions within a particular national context. This is not least to ensure that 
the preliminary reference of the CJEU will be subsequently followed by the national courts.  
Recalling El Dridi and Achugbabian, the CJEU held that Article 6(1) RD provides for an 
obligation to issue a return decision against any TCN illegally staying in a Member State. Exceptions 
from this obligation are permitted only in the strict circumstances laid down by Article 6(2) to (5) RD. 
It has to be noted that, until the Zaizoune judgment, the CJEU ruled only in cases where national 
legislation imposed stricter rules than those provided by the RD (El Dridi, Sagor), holding them to be 
incompatible with the RD. The CJEU decided to follow the same strict interpretation of the RD also in 
regard to the Spanish legislation which, as described by the referring court, provided for more 
favourable situations for the TCNs. Following the Zaizoune judgment, it is clear that Member States 
are prohibited from having legal provisions which hinder the principle of the effective application of 
the Directive, regardless of whether the national legal provisions impose stricter or more favourable 
conditions to the TCN illegally staying in a Member State.
22
 
It has to be noted that in the Zaizoune case, the preliminary reference was used as an instrument to 
end a national jurisprudential debate. Interestingly, the result sought for was not achieved. The 
national jurisprudential and legal debate seems to persist, due to alleged erroneous or incomplete 
interpretation of the relevant Spanish law given by the referring court in the submitted preliminary 
questions. Therefore, some of the national courts continued to apply the ‘doctrine of fine’ on grounds 
of the non-retroactivity of the CJEU. This was arguably done on the basis of the ECtHR judgment in 
the Del Rio Prada v Spain case, whereby preference should be given to the legal interpretation more 
                                                          
19 Supreme Court, judgment of 13 March 2013, STS 988/2013. 
20 Zaizoune, C-38/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:260; the request for the preliminary ruling is available on: http://euredial.eu/national-
caselaw/#/. 
21 According to the Spanish Report, see pp. 8 and 9. 
22 For a detailed comment of the Zaizoune judgment of the CJEU, see the Redial blog comment of this judgment by Cristina 
J. Gortázar Rotaeche, Nuria Ferré Trad, (available on: http://euredial.eu/blog/a-fine-or-removal-the-impact-of-the-ecjs-
zaizoune-judgment-on-the-spanish-doctrine/). 
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favourable to the sanctioned person. However, according to the settled CJEU case law, national courts 
cannot limit the temporal application of the CJEU judgments, which have retroactive application.
23
 
Only the Court of Justice can limit the temporal application on the basis of precise requirements,
24
 
either in the actual judgment ruling upon the sought interpretation
25
 or in a new preliminary ruling 
which assesses the effects of its previous judgment.
26
 Should the national courts encounter difficulties 
in understanding or enforcing the preliminary ruling, they can refer new preliminary questions to the 
Court, asking it to clarify its judgments based on new elements that may prompt the Court to give a 
different answer to a question already referred.
27
  
A possible solution to the alleged incompatibility of the Spanish legislation with the RD was put 
forward by Cristina J. Gortázar Rotaeche in her report. She proposes that Article 57(1) of the 
Immigration Act 4/2000 – which determines that a fine is the main sanction in cases of irregular TCNs 
– should be read jointly with Articles 24, 1 and 2 of Royal Decree 557/2011. These Articles establish 
compulsory departure within a period of a maximum of fifteen days.  
Spain is not the only jurisdiction where voluntary departure is problematic from the perspective of 
not being part of an administrative act that is formally a return decision challengeable as such before 
courts. In Cyprus, the administrative decision offering the possibility of voluntary departure is not 
considered an administrative act. It is a mere request that cannot be subjected to judicial review. In a 
judgment of 2013,
28
 the Cypriot Supreme Court found that ‘the standard letter which the immigration 
authorities customarily send to all TCNs in an irregular situation requesting them to depart by 
themselves does not constitute an executive administrative act but a mere request of no legal 
consequence and as such it cannot be subjected to judicial review or be suspended through an interim 
order. In essence, this means that the Court did not recognise the practice of the immigration 
authorities to request the applicant to depart as a voluntary departure decision within the meaning of 
the Return Directive.’29 
1.2.2 Conferral of voluntary departure – automatic or individual application procedure 
Article 7 RD establishes a scale of measures ranging from the least restrictive of the TCNs freedom 
(para. 1), to the most intrusive – refusal of the voluntary departure period (para. 4). The general rule is 
that voluntary departure should be given priority in front of all other measures provided by the RD.
30
 
The only margin of discretion permitted to Member States over the TCNs right to voluntary departure 
is to make that right subject to an individual application instead of automatic consideration by the 
administration. 
Some of the Member States made use of the option to grant VD solely by way of individual 
application (HU and IT). In cases where the Member State opted for a VD period granted by way of 
the TCN application, Article 7 of the RD imposes only one condition upon the Member State: namely 
to inform the TCN concerned of the possibility of submitting such an application. The timeframe for 
                                                          
23 See Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v SpA San Giorgio, C-199/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:318; Hauser, C-13/08, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:774. 
24 According to the Nisipeanu judgment, C-263/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:466, ‘33. [...] it is only by exception, in application of 
the general principle of judicial security, [...] that the Court may be determined to limit the possibility to invoke a 
provision it has interpreted. In order to impose such a limitation, two essential criteria must be met, i.e. good faith of the 
interested parties and the risk of serious disruption.’ 
25 See, Herrero, C-294/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:109; Maruko, C-267/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:179. 
26 See, Gerardus Cornelis Ten Oever, ECLI:EU:C:1993:833. 
27 Pretore di Salò, ECLI:EU:C:1987:275. 
28 Tatsiana Balashevich v. Republic, Case No. 5635/2013, judgement delivered on 10 July 2013. 
29 See the Cypriot National Report, p. 5. 
30 See El Dridi, para. 36. 
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the application, the criteria for granting and rejecting an application for VD, and the TCNs possibility 
of appealing this decision is left to the discretion of the Member States. There are certain general 
procedural constraints which Member States have to followed as laid down in Chapter III of the RD. 
Additionaly, Member States have to ensure the respect of the TCNs fundamental rights as enshrined in 
the EU Charter and the general principles of EU law
31
 when implementing or derogating from EU law. 
The rights to be heard, fair trial, effective remedies and family life have to be respected by the 
administrative authorities and national courts within the procedure of VD, regardless of whether the 
VD is conferred automatically or by way of individual application.
32
 
Italy is one of the countries that took advantage of the ‘VD by application’ option permitted by the 
RD. In order to obtain the VD, the TCN must prove that they have ‘enough economic resources 
deriving from legal sources proportionate to the term granted (from one to three times the amount of 
the monthly welfare check, i.e. the monthly welfare check amounts to Euro 448, 50 in 2015).’ One or 
more of the following obligations can be applied: a) submission of the passport or other equivalent 
document in course of validity, which will be given back at the moment of departure; b) the obligation 
to stay in a place previously identified, where the foreigner can be easily traced; c) daily attendance at 
the police office until the day of departure. The precise obligations are decided by the Questore in a 
written document, including the reasons for conferral, which have to be translated into a language that 
the concerned TCN understands. In practice all the information is provided on pre-stamped forms that 
TCNs have to sign before the adoption of a return decision.
33
 They are frequently not available in the 
mother tongue of the TCN. Similar problems regarding language translation of the return decision 
exist in other Member States. For instance, in Bulgaria the issue of adequate translation is even more 
vital, since Bulgaria has a one-step return procedure. Here it should be remembered that the Court of 
Justice emphasised that ‘Member States should ensure that the ending of the illegal stay of third-
country nationals is carried out through a fair and transparent procedure.’34 
The legality of using a widely-spoken language instead of the TCNs mother tongue for the 
translation of the administrative decision on voluntary departure has recently been raised before the 
Italian Supreme Court. With regard to the use of multilingual information sheets, the Italian Corte di 
Cassazione
35
 recalled the principles already affirmed with regard to the removal order: it is 
‘impossible’ to translate the removal order in a given language and consequently use one of the most 
widely spoken languages (e.g. English, French, etc.) ‘when the administration declares, and the judge 
considers it plausible, that a text in the foreigner’s mother language is not available (because 
particularly rare) or the inadequacy of this text in order to communicate the decision adopted in that 
case (because of its diversity from the other decisions normally adopted) and it is acknowledged that a 
translator is not available in that circumstance.’36 
The EU norm establishing the procedural safeguards in case of VD by individual application are to 
be found in the Commission Return Handbook, and they can be deduced from the Boudjlida judgment 
of the CJEU. According to the Return Handbook, general information sheets are not sufficient, and 
should always be complemented with individualised information.
37
 Following the CJEU’s Boudjlida 
judgment, it is clear that the Member States have to respect the TCNs right to be heard even before the 
adoption of a return decision, as well as during the entire return procedure, even when this possibility 
                                                          
31 Chakroun, C-578/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:117; ERT, C-260/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254; Pfleger, C-390/12, Åkerberg 
Fransson, C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105, para. 21; Commission v Lisrestal and Others, C-32/95 P, EU:C:1996:402, para. 30, 
and Sopropé, C-349/07, EU:C:2008:746, para. 26. 
32 Boudjlida, C-249/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2431. 
33 EC, Matrix Study on the Evaluation on the application of the Return Directive 2008/115/EC, p. 83. 
34 Mahdi, C-146/14 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1320, para. 40. 
35 See Corte di Cassazione, decision no. 1809/2014 . 
36 See the Italian National Report, p. 8. 
37 See Return Handbook, p. 35. 
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is not provided expressly by national legislation. The right to be heard confers on the TCN concerned 
the right to express his or her view on the legality of their stay. The national administration has also to 
examine carefully and impartially all relevant aspects of the individual case, and they must give a 
detailed statement of reasons for their decision. These have to be sufficiently specific and concrete to 
allow the TCN to understand why their application was rejected.
38
 
In addition to the limitation on the TCNs right to information regarding the VD application, Italian 
legislation automatically conditions the conferral of VD upon proving of possession of enough legal 
economic resources (i.e. 1,300 EUR). Additionally, the TCN has to fulfil one to three obligations, 
depending on the decision of the Questore, which are automatically attached to the VD measure. Of 
these, the daily attendance at the police office until the day of departure significantly limits the 
freedom of the TCN. Non-compliance with one of the imposed obligations can lead to immediate 
expulsion and a criminal fine ranging from 3,000 to 18,000 Euros. The automatic attachment of 
obligation(s) and the stringent requirements imposed by the Italian legislation on TCNs for the 
purpose of receiving a VD period do not seem to be compatible with the RD. It should be noted here 
that the RD does not impose a financial pre-requisite for the conferral of VD, nor does it make the VD 
dependent upon fulfillment of substantial conditions. Member States can impose such stringent 
obligations during the VD only in the precise circumstances set out in Article 7(3) RD.  
So far, the conformity of the Italian legislation with Article 7 RD has not been raised before the 
national courts. One possible reason might be the fact that until 2014, voluntary departure was 
considered only part of the execution phase of the return decision. Therefore, an assessment of its 
legality could have been performed solely within the framework of an assessment of the validity of the 
order of accompanying the TCN to the border or detention in a CIE. Following the Italian Corte di 
Cassazione judgment no. 437/2014, the refusal to grant voluntary departure, the period for VD, as well 
as other aspects of this measure can be challenged in an appeal against the return decision. Secondly, it 
seems that conferral of voluntary departure has become a pre-requisite for the assessment of the return 
decision’s legality.39  
1.2.3 Period of voluntary departure 
The moment when the period of voluntary departure starts to run and the precise VD period within 
which the TCN should return to his country of origin are not set out by the RD. Article 7(1) provides 
only for a mandatory timeframe, which starts with a minimum of 7 days and ends with a maximum of 
30 days. Most of the Member States transposed exactly this precise timeframe of between 7 and 30 
days into their national legislation, living the establishment of the precise period to the administration. 
Few Member States have implemented a different timeframe. Some Member States provide for a 
shorter period than the maximum one provided by the RD, such as: 14 days (Austria), 20 days 
(Portugal), and 28 days (Netherlands). In Austria the 14 days’ timeframe is fixed, with no margin of 
discretion being left to the administration on this issue. Other Member States seem to have more 
favourable provisions for the TCN, by establishing a higher minimum VD period than that set out by 
the RD: 10 days (Portugal) or higher than the maximum period (Czech Republic – 60 days).40  
  
                                                          
38 Boudjlida, para. 38. 
39 According to the Italian Report, p. 7. 
40 For a table including the implemented timeframe for VD by all 28 MSs, see the Evaluation on the application of the 
Return Directive (2008/115/EC), Final Report of the European Commission of 22 October 2013 (hereinafter 2013 
European Commission Evaluation Report), p. 83, available on: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/evaluation/search/download.do?documentId=10737855.  
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Period for VD MSs 
Exact transposition of the timeframe
41
 
 
DE, DK, EE, EL, FI, FR, HU, IT, LT, LU, LV, 
MT, PL, RO, SE, SI, SK 
Max exceeding 30 days CZ – 60 days 
Max lower than 30 days AT – 14 days 
ES – 15 days 
PT – 20 days 
NL – 28 days 
Min higher than 7 days PT – 10 days 
There is little national jurisprudence reviewing the period of VD. The reason for the limited 
national jurisprudence is the fact that in most Member States, this issue falls under the jurisdiction of 
the administrative judge, who is not competent to replace the administrative decision with his own 
decision. Therefore the VD period is, in practice, subject to judicial review only to the extent of 
whether the period was or was not conferred, while the precise timeframe is left to the discretion of the 
administration. Based on the information provided by the eleven national Reports, it seems that, in 
practice, the administrative authorities commonly establish a period close to the maximum one 
allowed by the national law.  
Reviewing the adequacy of the national authority’s assessment of the length of the period for 
voluntary departure is usually done by national courts. Such reviews normally take place only in as 
much as there has been a manifest error committed by the administration (CZ, FR). Some of the 
national Reports mentioned that, occasionally, national courts will assess the authority’s decision for 
the VD period, when the maximum period was not conferred. In this circumstance, several factors will 
be taken into account. These include the existence of previous return/removal attempts; the existence 
of family relatives; the duration of the period of stay of the TCN; and Article 8 ECHR related aspects 
(e.g. Netherlands). The cost of the flight ticket and frequency of the flights is considered irrelevant 
(Czech Republic). Family related aspects which would fall under the scope of Article 8 ECHR are not 
usually considered as reasons for establishing the VD period, since the authorities commonly grant the 
maximum period. Aspects related to the family life are more often considered in the context of 
paragraph 2: extension of the VD period.
42
 
A common issue regarding the VD period in national jurisprudence is the establishment of the 
precise moment when the VD period should start to run. The National Reports mention the moment 
when the return decision/removal order becomes final and enforceable as the moment when VD period 
starts to run. Additionally, national courts have clarified that the moment of VD should start to run 
when the TCN is free to make the necessary return arrangements: thus the period of detention for other 
criminal acts should not be included. The Czech legislation provides that should the VD period start to 
run during the detention of the third-country national, its application will be postponed for after the 
                                                          
41 Croatia is within the category of Member States that have chosen to transpose the precise timeframe of 7 to 30 days 
provided by Article 7(1) RD. 
42 As rightly pointed out by the Dutch National Report, this point of view may raise concerns as regards its conformity with 
Article 5 RD, in light of the CJEU judgment in Boudjlida, (ECLI:EU:C:2014:2431, para. 49) whereby: ‘It follows that, 
when the competent national authority is contemplating the adoption of a return decision, that authority must necessarily 
observe the obligations imposed by Article 5 of Directive 2008/115 and hear the person concerned on that subject.’ This 
opinion seems to be shared also by the Commission, see Return Handbook, p. 35. 
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termination of the detention.
43
 Similarly, if the third-country national is detained during the VD period, 
this period shall be suspended until end of the detention period.
44
  
National courts seem to commonly consider the VD period as starting, when the TCN is free of 
criminal sanctions which restrict his or her liberty. The CAA of Paris in a judgment of 2013
45
 quashed 
an administrative decision which did not take into account the existence of criminal sanctions to which 
the TCN was subject to establish the start of the period of VD. 
1.3 Paragraph (2)
46
 – extension of the voluntary departure period 
According to Article 7(2) RD, Member States have an obligation to extend the period for VD 
beyond the maximum 30 days when certain specific circumstances of the individual case are met. The 
paragraph sets out a non-exhaustive list of three such circumstances, such as: as the length of stay; the 
existence of children attending school; and the existence of other family and social links. The majority 
of Member States provide for the possibility of extending the VD, which in most jurisdictions has to 
be made by way of individual application, and exceptionally can be considered by the public 
authorities automatically. There are a few exceptions where this possibility is not provided for in the 
national legislation (e.g. the Czech Republic). However, according to a survey of national practices, 
these Member States have committed themselves to amending their legislation accordingly.
47
  
In some Member States prolongation is possible only through an application (e.g. Cyprus, Italy and 
the Netherlands).  
An aspect of Article 7(2) – on which national courts have significantly contributed in clarifying the 
meaning of the RD and limiting the previous discretion of the administration – is the nature of the 
‘specific circumstances of the individual case’. Administrative authorities in Austria used to interpret 
the RD as referring only to circumstances in the Member State which issued the return decision. 
Austrian courts disagreed and held that also circumstances in the target country may lead to a 
prolongation and create the necessity to prolong the period. Former Austrian High Administrative 
Court stated that, primarily, reasons in Austria play a role but also – as mentioned – circumstances in 
the country of origin. For instance, the fact that the TCN concerned was not able to return to their 
country of origin in winter, because there was no place there to live with (adequate) heating was taken 
into account; as was the fact that their son was born in Austria and was not registered in Byelorussia. 
Therefore the VD period was subsequently extended.
48
 This particular interpretation of the concept of 
the ‘specific circumstances of the individual case’ given by the Austrian High Administrative Court 
has been endorsed also by the Commission in its Return Handbook. This indicates that ‘the term 
‘where necessary’ refers to circumstances both in the sphere of the returnee and in the sphere of the 
returning State.’49 
The circumstances expressly mentioned by the RD as legitimate grounds for the prolongation of the 
VD period are the following: length of stay; children attending school; and family links. According to 
the Commission Handbook on the application of the Return Directive, the three circumstances 
                                                          
43 Art. 118(3) ALA, the third sentence. 
44 Art. 118(3) ALA, the fourth sentence. 
45 CAA Paris, 22/03/2013, no. 12PA03710, see more in the French Report. 
46 Article 7(2) RD reads as follows: ‘Member States shall, where necessary, extend the period for voluntary departure by an 
appropriate period, taking into account the specific circumstances of the individual case, such as the length of stay, the 
existence of children attending school and the existence of other family and social links.’ 
47 According to 2013 European Commission Evaluation Report, Czech Republic, Denmark, France and Malta committed to 
amend their legislation. According to the Czech Report, the national legislation has still not been brought in line with the 
requirements of Article 7(2) RD. 
48 High Administrative Court, 2012/21/0072, 16.5.2013. 
49 Return Handbook, p. 36. 
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mentioned in Article 7(2) must be expressly included in the national implementing legislation, and 
they must be respected by the administrative and jurisprudential practice. Not all Member States 
expressly refer to these circumstances in their legislation. For example, Austrian legislation does not 
provide for any, while the Czech Republic and Germany do not include TCN children attending 
school among the circumstances justifying extension. However, even if some of the Member States 
have not implemented the specific circumstances for the extension of the VD period, national courts 
do take some of them into consideration (e.g. Austria).
50
 
According to the 2013 Commission Evaluation Report, the grounds, which in practice, appear to be 
most used for justifying the prolongation of VD period are the following: health issues and children of 
the TCN attending school (cited in 11 countries).
51
 The list of circumstances provided in Article 7(2) is 
not exhaustive; Member States can add other relevant factors.
52
 Health reasons and organisation of 
travel documentation is among the most common additional circumstances considered in practice, as 
legitimate ground for the prolongation of the VD period. The pregnancy of the wife of the concerned 
TCN is commonly taken into consideration by national courts among family and social circumstance 
(e.g. Austria, Belgium, and France). On the other hand, ongoing divorce procedure is not considered a 
valid reason (France, CAA Nantes, 26/02/2015). Organising travel documentation is taken into 
consideration in a few jurisdictions, however on a case by case basis not generally. When considering 
the legitimacy of the invoked grounds for the prolongation of the VD period, certain national courts 
pay due attention to the issue of whether the application submitted by the TCN is abusive or not (DE). 
For instance, according to the German jurisprudence uploaded in the REDIAL database, national 
courts take into consideration whether the request for prolongation is truly aimed at arranging return, 
or whether rather it is to legalise the claimant’s stay (e.g. return of the wife/partner with children).53 
One of the main problems concerning the extension of the VD period is that, unlike the first 
paragraph of Article 7, the second paragraph does not set out a fixed timeframe for the extension of the 
period for VD, which thus leaves a considerable margin of discretion to the Member States on 
establishing the extension period. As a general rule, this period should be set by the authorities on a case 
by case basis. On this specific issue, the Commission’s Handbook provides that extensions of up to one 
year in cases of TCNs having children attending school are covered by the RD.
54
 In practice, the period 
of prolongation varies from one year in cases of TCNs having children attending school, to the period 
covering pregnancy plus eight weeks after birth,
55
 to a suitable period for post-surgery recuperation. 
In several Member States, national courts limit themselves to assessing whether the administrative 
authority has committed a manifest error of interpretation in refusing to prolong the VD period: this is 
the case, for example, in France
56
 and Hungary.
57
 However, other national courts have showed a more 
intrusive role and have assessed the arguments and evidence submitted by the administration. Courts 
have established new circumstances among the common factors justifying extension of the VD period 
                                                          
50 According to the Austrian Report, p. 3, ‘the Government Proposal (legislative document) § 55 (3) Aliens Police Act 
transposes Art. 7(2) RD. The Government proposal also refers to examples. These are the previous length of stay of the 
third country national, the necessity that a child completes a semester at an Austrian school.’ 
51 Ibid., p. 88. 
52 For a detailed table on the Member States’ legislation regarding circumstances granting an extension of the period for 
voluntary departure, see Table 25 in the 2013 European Commission Evaluation Report, p. 86. 
53 See Higher Administrative Court of Northrhine-Westfalia, 18 B 779/15. 
54 Return Handbook, p. 35. 
55 Federal Administrative Court, G307 2013610-1, 24.2.2015, see the Austrian Report. 
56 See, CAA Lyon, judgment of 29/08/2013. 
57 See the Hungarian Report. 
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or quashed an administrative decision refusing an extension when not sufficiently supported by 
evidence (Austria).
58
 
1.4 Paragraph (3)
59
 – obligations pending voluntary departure  
Article 7(3) RD provides for certain obligations which should minimize the risk of absconding 
during voluntary departure. These obligations include: 1) regular reporting to the authorities; 2) the 
deposit of an adequate financial guarantee; and/or 3) submission of documents or the obligation to stay 
at a certain place. They can be imposed only in the specific circumstance of ‘avoiding the risk of 
absconding’. This particular circumstance justifies the application of more stringent conditions to be 
followed by the TCN within the VD period. The purpose of imposing additional obligations pending 
voluntary departure is to allow a period of voluntary departure in cases which would not normally 
otherwise qualify for such treatment.
60
 Preserving the VD measure, while requiring the TCN to fulfil 
certain obligations during this period, is a compromise between ensuring the fulfilment of the RD 
objective – effective removal – and the principle of ‘voluntarism’ and proportionality which govern 
the return procedure. Requiring certain obligations to be fulfilled by the TCN concerned is an 
alternative to the more stringent decision of shortening the VD period to less than seven days or even 
refraining from granting such a period and imposing instead the removal of the TCN. According to the 
CJEU, this gradualism should be followed by national authorities and courts when a risk of 
absconding is identified.
61
 
The option of imposing additional obligations, aimed at avoiding the risk of absconding of the 
TCN during the voluntary departure period has been transposed by most of the Member States.
62
 
1.4.1 Risk of absconding – definition and application 
According to the RD, the risk of absconding can be grounds for: attaching certain obligations to be 
complied with by the TCN during the voluntary departure (Article 7(3)); shortening the VD period or 
refusing to confer voluntary departure (Article 7(4)); and as a last resort measure – detention (Article 
15)). The definition of this concept does not vary under EU law depending on the measure to be taken 
within the return procedure. The ‘risk of absconding’ is generally defined by Article 3(7) RD. The 
principles of ‘voluntarism’, ‘gradualism’ and proportionality determine the precise return measure to 
be taken when the authorities identify a risk of absconding.
63
 
                                                          
58 See, inter alia, High Administrative Court, 2012/21/0072, 16.5.2013 and Federal Administrative Court, W196 2015947-1, 
28.1.2015. 
59 Article 7(3) RD reads as follows: ‘Certain obligations aimed at avoiding the risk of absconding, such as regular reporting 
to the authorities, deposit of an adequate financial guarantee, submission of documents or the obligation to stay at a 
certain place may be imposed for the duration of the period for voluntary departure.’ 
60 See Return Handbook, p. 36. 
61 El Dridi, para. 41. 
62 Except of Hungary, Luxembourg, and Sweden. As for the Czech Republic, the possibility was introduced but not in cases 
of risk of absconding, but threat to public policy and national security, since the national legislation implementing the 
Return Directive does not refer to the ‘risk of absconding’. 
63 See El Dridi, paras. 37-39: ‘It follows from Article 7(3) and (4) of that directive that it is only in particular circumstances, 
such as where there is a risk of absconding, that Member States may, first, require the addressee of a return decision to 
report regularly to the authorities, deposit an adequate financial guarantee, submit documents or stay at a certain place or, 
second, grant a period shorter than seven days for voluntary departure or even refrain from granting such a period. 38 In 
the latter situation, but also where the obligation to return has not been complied with within the period for voluntary 
departure, Article 8(1) and (4) of Directive 2008/115 provides that, in order to ensure effective return procedures, those 
provisions require the Member State which has issued a return decision against an illegally staying third-country national 
to carry out the removal by taking all necessary measures including, where appropriate, coercive measures, in a 
proportionate manner and with due respect for, inter alia, fundamental rights. 39 In that regard, it follows from recital 16 
in the preamble to that directive and from the wording of Article 15(1) that the Member States must carry out the removal 
using the least coercive measures possible. It is only where, in the light of an assessment of each specific situation, the 
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According to Article 3(7) RD, ‘Member States must base their assessment of whether there is or 
not a risk of absconding on objective criteria fixed in national legislation.’64 Most Member States have 
transposed the possibility of imposing obligations aimed at avoiding the risk of absconding.
65
 
However, according to the 2013 Commission Evaluation Survey, only three Member States have 
defined the risk of absconding in the context of voluntary departure, namely Luxemburg, Latvia and 
Slovenia.
66
 The rest of the Member States usually apply the obligations set out in Article 7(3) RD in 
the context of alternatives to detention.  
The RD does not provide a detailed definition of the precise grounds that can justify the 
establishment of a ‘risk of absconding’. It only establishes general criteria that national authorities 
have to fulfil when choosing certain factors: criteria must be objective and fixed in national legislation. 
Based on the eleven national Reports and the information collected by the CONTENTION Synthesis 
Report
67
 and Commission Handbook,
68
 it seems that the following grounds are among the ones most 
referred to national legislation: lack of documentation; absence of cooperation to determinate identity; 
lack of residence; use of false documentation or the deliberate destruction of existing documents; 
failing repeatedly to report to the relevant authorities; explicit expression of intent of non-compliance; 
existence of conviction for criminal offence; non-compliance with existing entry ban; and the violation 
of a return decision. In certain Member States, the list of objective indicators for a risk of absconding 
is not exhaustively provided by the national legislation (e.g. Bulgaria). 
Dutch legislation offers the most detailed criteria, providing for fifteen grounds for finding of a 
‘risk of absconding’. These criteria have been divided by the legislation itself, into substantial69 and 
non-substantial
70
 grounds. In the case of substantial grounds, the authorities do not need to provide 
further justification in order to prove the risk exists in an individual case.
71
 If two or more substantial 
grounds are applicable, the period for VD is refused. Non-substantial grounds may not, in themselves, 
lead to the conclusion that there is such a risk. Instead authorities are required to provide further 
justifications.
72
 This broadly defined ‘objective criteria’ often leads, in practice, to the automatic 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
enforcement of the return decision in the form of removal risks being compromised by the conduct of the person 
concerned that the Member States may deprive that person of his liberty and detains him.’ 
64 See Return Handbook, p. 11. 
65 With few exceptions, such as Hungary, where the existence of a risk of absconding leads only to situations such as those 
envisaged by Article 7(4) or 15 RD. Czech legislation implementing the Return Directive does not refer at all to the risk 
of absconding. The concept is defined only in the context of the Return Directive, see more details in the Czech Report. 
66 According to the 2013 Commission Evaluation Report, p. 91. 
67 The CONTENTION Synthesis Report is freely available on: http://contention.eu/docs/Synthesis_Report.pdf. 
68 According to Return Handbook, p. 36. 
69 According to Article 5.1b Aliens Decree: ‘The third-country national has not entered the country lawfully, or has tried to 
do so; he has evaded supervision for some time; he has received in the past any notification, obliging him to leave the 
country before the end of a specified period, and has not done so voluntarily; He does not cooperate in assessing his 
identity or nationality; he has, with reference to his application for permission to stay in the country, given false or 
contradictory statements regarding his identity, nationality or his journey to the Netherlands or any other Member State; 
he has gotten rid of travel- or identifying documents, without any need to do so; he has made use of false or falsified 
documents in the Netherlands; he has been declared an undesired alien according to Dutch Law, or an entry ban has been 
issued against him according to the law; he has declared that he will not fulfil his obligation to return (as defined in the 
Return Directive) or his departure to the Member State that is responsible for his application for asylum (according to the 
Dublin regulation).’ 
70 According to Article 5.1b Aliens Decree: ‘The third-country national does not fulfil one or more obligations, laid down in 
chapter 4 of the Aliens Act (i.e. the obligation to report to the authorities on a regular basis); he has unsuccessfully 
applied more than once for a residence permit; he has no permanent residence; he has no sufficient resources; he is 
suspected of or convicted for a crime; he has worked although he was not allowed to do so according to the Law.’ 
71 Council of State 27 February 2014, 201303624/1/V3, see also Aliens Circulaire A3/3. See Dutch Report, p. 3. 
72 Information provided by the G. Cornelisse and J. Bouwman, National Report for Netherlands. 
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decisions of the administration establishing a risk of absconding. According to the Dutch Report, these 
objective criteria seem not to go beyond the mere fact of illegal stay.
73
  
Any automaticity in proving the existence of a risk of absconding raises concerns as regards the 
conformity of the Dutch legislation and practice with the RD. For instance the automatic conclusion of 
the existence of a ‘risk of absconding’ solely on the basis of an illegal entry reverses the burden of 
proof from the national authorities to the TCN. This, of course, is contrary to Article 7(3) RD and 
contradicts the principles of case by case analysis and proportionality which govern the return 
procedure.
74
 Reasoned opinions and individual assessment of each case should be preferred against 
automatic decisions.
75
 
In practice objective criteria should be taken into account ‘as an element in the overall assessment 
of the individual situation, but it cannot be the sole basis for assuming automatically a “risk of 
absconding”.’76  
Some Member States refer in addition to the risk of absconding to the existence of threats to public 
order or security, thus extending the special circumstances provided by Article 7(3) RD. For example, 
the Austrian legislation seems to provide for more favourable provisions for the TCN since its 
legislation requires the presence of a ‘risk of absconding’, and not a ‘future risk of absconding’,77 as 
the Directive seems to suggest. The Austrian Federal Administrative Court established that it is not 
sufficient to make general statements, such as, ‘there is no integration in Austrian society or legal 
order’,78 in order to justify the existence of a risk of absconding. 
Italy is among the countries with the highest level of automaticity in establishing a risk of 
absconding. According to the Italian legislation and practice, any TCN benefiting of a VD period will 
have to comply with at least one obligation.
79
 According to the Italian Report, it seems that national 
authorities do not need to prove a ‘risk of absconding’, since the risk is presumed ab initio when VD is 
conferred. 
A positive evolution in the application of the principle of gradualism has recently been registered in 
certain national jurisdictions. National courts scrutinise the failure of the administrative authorities to 
adequately assess the possibility of imposing one or multiple obligations as an alternative prior to a 
coercive removal order. The lack of adequate reasons given by the authorities for refusing to first 
impose VD with attached obligations prior to giving a removal order is interpreted by national courts 
as a legitimate grounds for quashing the administrative order for removal (CZ).
80
 
1.4.2 Obligations to be fulfilled pending VD 
The most common obligations imposed by the Member States, when there is a risk of absconding, 
are regular reporting to the authorities followed by staying in a certain place, submission of documents 
                                                          
73 Dutch National Report, p. 4. 
74 See recitals 13 and 16 of the RD, El Dridi, ibid., para. 41, and Opinion of AG in Celaj case, C-290/14, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:285, para. 29 and 49. 
75 See, for a similar opinion, Return Handbook, p. 12. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Article 7(3) RD refers to ‘avoiding a risk of absconding’, implying thus that only a mere future risk of absconding is 
sufficient to justifying the establishment of obligations during the VD period. 
78 See Federal Administrative Court, G307 2009115-1/2E, 28.7.2014, see the Austrian Report. 
79 The obligations provided by the Italian legislation are the following: a) submission of the passport or other equivalent 
document in course of validity, which will be given back at the moment of departure; b) the obligation to stay in a place 
previously identified, where the foreigner can be easily traced; c) daily attendance at the police office until the day of 
departure. 
80 For more details, see the Czech Report. 
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and then the deposit of an adequate financial guarantee.
81
 These obligations can be cumulatively 
imposed. Some Member States, such as Italy and Netherlands, impose all the above mentioned 
obligations pending voluntary departure. In Italy, the amount of the deposit ranges from one to three 
times the amount of the monthly welfare check: note that the monthly welfare check amounts to Euro 
448,50 in 2015). Member States foresee amounts varying from around 200 Euro to 5,000 Euro.
82
 In 
addition to a cumbersome financial burden, Italian legislation has transposed the obligation of regular 
reporting as an obligation of to go daily to the police office to be registered until the day of 
departure.
83
 The effects of these intrusive obligations automatically attached by the Italian legislation 
to the VD measure are capable of denying the voluntary character of the measure, bringing voluntary 
departure closer to a coercive measure. 
Obligations to be fulfilled pending VD are usually set at the moment of adopting the return 
decision, and not during the period for VD. Challenging the decision of fulfilling certain obligations 
thus means challenging the return decision itself. 
Based on the information provided by the national academics it seems that the most common 
problems in the application of Article 7(3) RD, that courts have to deal with, result mostly from the 
definition of the ‘risk of absconding’. National legislations define too loosely the ‘risk of absconding’ 
and also permit a wide power to the administration in finding such a risk. National courts have thus to 
fill the gap left by the national legislation and scrutinise the administration discretion, while enjoying a 
limited jurisdiction to review the administrative decisions. Recently, there seems to be an ascending 
jurisprudential trend whereby courts no longer accept as justified the automatic finding of a risk of 
absconding (see, in particular, the Austrian, Czech and French courts). Furthermore, national courts 
pay closer attention to the principle of proportionality when deciding the effects of the risk of 
absconding: these include, establishing VD with attached obligations; limiting the VD period; refusing 
VD; and adopting a removal order, or detention (in particular, AT, BG, and CZ).
84
 
There seems to be a lack of uniform interpretation of the effects attached to the objective criteria 
justifying the establishment of a ‘risk of absconding’. It is interesting to notice that lack of passport or 
residence permit fora TCN is considered by several Member States as an objective justifying the 
existence of a risk of absconding. However, while in certain Member States this situation alone is 
commonly considered to be enough to establish certain obligations to be fulfilled during the VD 
period (NL), in other Member States it was considered sufficient by the administration and courts to 
justify detention (!). In the case of Re. Rita Kumah,
85
 a Cypriot court found ‘that detention is 
necessary for as long as there is a risk of absconding and there is a risk of absconding in this case 
because the applicant did not have a passport or a residence permit.’86  
Should the TCN fail to fulfil the obligations established during the VD period, and should he or she 
fail to cooperate to ensure assisted voluntary departure or should there be a higher risk of absconding, 
which cannot be effectively minimised by way of imposing certain obligations, the national authorities 
can shorten or refuse the VD under the last paragraph of Article 7 RD. 
                                                          
81 According to the data provided by the 2013 Commission Evaluation Report and REDIAL national reports, available on: 
http://euredial.eu/publications/national-synthesis-reports/.  
82 See Return Handbook, p. 36. 
83 It has to be noticed that Italian legislation is among the most stringent legislative frameworks, the obligation of regular 
reporting is commonly transposed as an obligation of weekly reporting (e.g. BG, FR, LT). Recently several member 
States have relaxed their rules on the obligation of regular reporting (see Matrix Survey 2013). 
84 Judgement of the SAC of 30 September 2014, No. 9 Azs 192/2014, § 22. 
85 Re the application of Rita Kumah, Supreme Court, Civil application No. 198/2013, 29 November 2013. Available on: 
http://www.cylaw.org/cgi-bin/open.pl?file=apofaseis/aad/meros_1/2013/1-201311-198-
13.htm&qstring=%E1%F0%E5%EB%E1%F3%2A. 
86 See the Cypriot Report, p. 6. 
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1.5 Paragraph 4
87
 – shortening the VD period or refusal of VD 
Pursuant to Article 7(4) RD, Member States may, under certain circumstances, grant a period 
shorter than seven days or refuse to grant a period for voluntary departure. The specific circumstances 
when Member States may derogate from the general obligation of granting a VD period are 
exhaustively set out by the provision, namely if there is a risk of absconding, if an application for a 
legal stay has been dismissed as manifestly unfounded or fraudulent, or if the TCN concerned poses a 
risk to public policy, public security or national security. The majority of the Member States have 
transposed ad verbatim this paragraph. However, there are also exceptions, such as in Bulgaria. Article 
39b (4) of the Bulgarian Law on Foreign Nationals provides that a period for voluntary departure shall 
not be granted when the foreign national ‘poses a threat to the national security or the public 
order’. The Bulgarian law has not transposed the rest of the grounds for refraining from granting a 
period for voluntary leave under Article 7 (4) of the Return Directive such as, for example, the risk of 
absconding.
88
 
1.5.1 Guidelines offered by the Directive and CJEU jurisprudence on the definition of the risk of 
absconding and grounds for refusing VD 
Article 3(7) RD defines the risk of absconding as ‘the existence of reasons in an individual case 
which are based on objective criteria defined by law to believe that a third-country national who is the 
subject of return procedures may abscond.’ This means that Member States have to include in their 
national legislation the objective criteria which justify the existence of a risk that a TCN, subject of 
return procedures, may abscond. The Directive does not enumerate those objective criteria, leaving it 
to the Member States to define them. Member States have to respect certain general principles when 
choosing the criteria on the basis of which a risk of absconding is presumed. These include: respect of 
fundamental rights; legal certainty (the national legislation has to provide a definition of the risk of 
absconding based on objective factors); legality (the objective criteria have to be provided in the 
national legislation); and individual examination (‘the existence of reasons in an individual case’). 
Although the Court of Justice of the EU has not set out the precise objective criteria justifying the 
presumption of risk of absconding, it has offered certain guidelines that need to be followed by 
national authorities. The CJEU emphasised the necessity of individual examination of law based 
objective criteria.
89
  
The CJEU has clarified that voluntary departure is a mandatory measure, a right of all TCNs subject 
to a return decision or equivalent decision. Derogations from this right are expressly provided in 
paragraph four of Article 7, and should be strictly interpreted.
90
 It can thus be implied from the Court 
                                                          
87 Article 7(4) RD reads as follows: ‘If there is a risk of absconding, or if an application for a legal stay has been dismissed as 
manifestly unfounded or fraudulent, or if the person concerned poses a risk to public policy, public security or national 
security, Member States may refrain from granting a period for voluntary departure, or may grant a period shorter than 
seven days.’ 
88 See similarly the Czech Republic. 
89 See Sagor, para. 41. 
90 See, the El Dridi judgment of the CJEU, paras. 36-38: ‘As part of that initial stage of the return procedure, priority is to be 
given, except where otherwise provided for, to voluntary compliance with the obligation resulting from that return 
decision, with Article 7(1) of Directive 2008/115 providing that the decision must provide for an appropriate period for 
voluntary departure of between seven and thirty days. 37 It follows from Article 7(3) and (4) of that directive that it is 
only in particular circumstances, such as where there is a risk of absconding, that Member States may, first, require the 
addressee of a return decision to report regularly to the authorities, deposit an adequate financial guarantee, submit 
documents or stay at a certain place or, second, grant a period shorter than seven days for voluntary departure or even 
refrain from granting such a period. 38 In the latter situation, but also where the obligation to return has not been 
complied with within the period for voluntary departure, Article 8(1) and (4) of Directive 2008/115 provides that, in 
order to ensure effective return procedures, those provisions require the Member State which has issued a return decision 
against an illegally staying third-country national to carry out the removal by taking all necessary measures including, 
where appropriate, coercive measures, in a proportionate manner and with due respect for, inter alia, fundamental rights.’ 
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statement that the three circumstances provided by Article 7(4) as grounds for shortening or refusing VD 
are exhaustive, precluding the Member States from providing additional criteria. Consequently, the VD 
period can be shortened to a period of less than 7 days, or refused altogether if one of the following three 
circumstances exists: risk of absconding; abusive applications for legal stay (an application for a legal 
stay has been dismissed as manifestly unfounded or fraudulent); and societal risk (public policy, public 
security, national security). Recently the CJEU offered guidelines on the interpretation of ‘the risk to 
public policy’ concept as a ground for justifying the refusal of the VD measure. 
In a judgment delivered by the CJEU 11 of June 2015,
91
 the Court clarified the meaning of the 
‘risk to public policy’, which, unlike the ‘risk of absconding’ is not defined by Article 3 or other 
Articles of the RD. First and foremost, the risk of public policy is a different concept from the risk of 
absconding. Member States are precluded from relying on general practices or assumptions in order to 
determine the existence of such a risk.
92
 Instead they are required to asses, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether the personal conduct of a given TCN poses a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat 
affecting one of the fundamental interests of society, in addition to the perturbation of the social order 
which any infringement of the law involves.
93
 Suspicion that the TCN has committed a criminal 
offence or an established criminal offence cannot, in themselves, ‘justify a finding that that national 
poses a risk to public policy within the meaning of Article 7(4) of Directive 2008/115.’94 Other 
factors, such as the nature and seriousness of that act, the time which has elapsed since it was 
committed and any matter which relates to the reliability of the suspicion that the TCN committed a 
criminal offence is also relevant for a case-by-case assessment, which needs to be carried out.
95
  
1.5.2 National jurisprudence 
The RD list of three circumstances when the VD can be reduced or refused altogether have not 
been transposed by all the Member States. For instance, Hungary has its own list of circumstances,
96
 
while the Bulgarian implementing legislation does not include the risk to absconding, but only ‘threat 
to the national security or the public order’.97 In the Dorofeev case,98 the Bulgarian Supreme 
Administrative Court dealt with the difference between Article 7 (4) of the Return Directive and the 
Bulgarian transposition law, and found it compatible with the Directive. ‘Since the national lawmaker 
provided as a basis for the non-conferral of the period for voluntary departure only the danger for the 
national security or public order, the Court found, that precisely these circumstances, if pointed out 
and duly proven, would be a basis for the non-conferral of the period for voluntary compliance with 
the measure.’ In light of the CJEU definition of the ‘risk/threat to public policy’, the latter requires 
more stringent conditions than the risk of absconding as defined by Article 3(7) RD. It could be argued 
that Bulgarian law establishes more favourable provisions, falling under the scope of Article 4 RD. 
However, following the Zaizoune judgment, it is not clear whether the characterisation of more 
                                                          
91 Z. Zh. and O., C-554/13. 
92 See also Sagor. 
93 See paras 50 and 60. 
94 Para. 60. 
95 Para. 65. 
96 Section 42 of Act No II of 2007 provided the following four circumstances ‘a) the third-country national’s right of 
residence was terminated due to his/her expulsion or exclusion, or for whom an alert has been issued in the SIS for the 
purpose of refusing entry and the right of residence; b) the third-country national’s application for residence permit was 
refused by the authority on the grounds referred to in Paragraphs b) and d) of Subsection (1) of Section 18; c) the third-
country national has expressly refused to leave the territory of the Member States of the European Union voluntarily, or, 
based on other substantiated reasons, is not expected to abide by the decision for his/her expulsion; d) the third-country 
national’s residence in Hungary represents a serious threat to public security, public policy or national security.’ 
97 See, the Law on Foreign Nationals in the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 39b (4). 
98 Judgment of the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court, 12/12/2011. 
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favourable provision would be sufficient to ensure the conformity of Bulgarian implementing 
legislation. This is an aspect which might in the future be clarified by the Court of Justice. 
Another problematic legislative framework is the Spanish legislation which provides for an urgent 
expulsion procedure, precluding the conferral of VD. The grounds which justify the urgent procedure 
are not limited to the three circumstances provided by Article 7(4), but extend to other 
circumstances.
99
 The additional circumstances of ‘risk of non-appearance’ have often been challenged 
by TCNs as not proven or insufficient for setting up the urgent procedure and for denying VD. 
Based on the information submitted by the eleven national Reports, it seems that the most invoked 
circumstance of the three provided by Article 7(3) is the risk of absconding. The term is broadly 
defined by the legislation and administration of these Member States. It includes situations when the 
TCN cannot justify that he or she has lawfully entered the Member State’s territory, and has not 
requested the issue of a residence permit (France similar provision in Netherlands); alternatively he is 
not in possession of a passport or other equivalent document; or the TCN does not have proper 
documentation proving the availability of a residence where he/she can be easily traced (Belgium, 
Italy), or has committed a criminal offence. In Cyprus a presumption that there is a high risk of 
absconding in every case of irregular migrants has led in practice to a standard practice of refusing VD 
and establishing detention as the standard return measure. According to the National Report, Cypriot 
courts appear unwilling to interfere with this administrative practice.  
These situations are likely to exist in relation to most TCNs, without signaling a concrete risk of 
absconding. National courts in the respective Member States have been quite deferential towards the 
decision of the administration to refuse VD, establishing a removal order based on these broad 
understanding of the risk of absconding, without always questioning the existence of a real risk. This 
practice might raise concerns as regard its conformity with the principle of proportionality required by 
the RD.
100
 
Abusive applications for legal stay are often interpreted as falling under the scope of ‘risk of 
absconding’. Grounds such as criminal convictions or suspicion of criminal conviction are considered 
as falling under the ‘risk of absconding’ and could lead automatically to refusal of VD (e.g. Cyprus, 
Belgium, Spain, and Germany).
101
 In recent years, jurisprudential practice has been changing on 
whether these grounds, in themselves, are sufficient to refuse VD and trigger a removal order. It is 
expected that following the Z. Zh. and O. judgment, national courts will refuse to accept mere criminal 
conviction, or suspicion of having committed a criminal offence, as being sufficient in themselves, to 
refuse VD. Failed attempts of returning the TCN prior to the last return decision, or failure to comply 
with the obligations attached to the VD measure are often considered a solid and/or sufficient grounds 
for establishing a risk of absconding. 
According to the Dutch legislation and practice, if two of the substantial grounds falling under the 
scope of the risk of absconding
102
 are found by the administration, then VD is automatically refused. 
                                                          
99 Article 63 (1) of the Immigration Act 4/2000 ‘1) there is a risk of non-appearance; 2) if the third-country national hinders 
his/her removal; or 3) if the third-country national represents a risk for the public order, public security or national 
security’. 
100 See, in particular, Conseil Constitutionnel, décision 2011-631 DC, see also the French Report, p. 9. 
101 See, Administrative Court of Augsburg, Au 6 K 12.667, 16-01-2013. 
102 To begin with the first, Dutch law defines the following circumstances as substantial grounds for assuming a risk of 
absconding: The third-country national has not entered the country lawfully, or has tried to do so; He has evaded 
supervision for some time;  He has received in the past any notification, obliging him to leave the country before 
the end of a specified period, and has not done so voluntarily; He does not cooperate in assessing his identity or 
nationality; He has, with reference to his application for permission to stay in the country, given false or 
contradictory statements regarding his identity, nationality or his journey to the Netherlands or any other Member State; 
He has gotten rid of travel- or identifying documents, without any need to do so; He has made use of false or falsified 
documents in the Netherlands; He has been declared an undesired alien according to Dutch Law, or an entry ban has been 
issued against him according to the law; He has declared that he will not fulfil his obligation to return (as defined in the 
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According to the Dutch Report, following the CJEU judgment in the Zh. and O case, the factual 
reversal of the burden of proof, in cases where the authorities invoke the so-called substantial grounds, 
might not be in conformity with the strict requirements set by the Court under Article 7(4) RD. 
According to the author of the Dutch Report,
103
 ‘this is especially so because the Member States, when 
they refuse to grant a period for voluntary removal, derogate “from an obligation designed to ensure 
that the fundamental rights of third-country nationals are respected” (C-554/13, Zh. and O.). What’s 
more, when we take into account the content of some of these grounds as laid down in Dutch law, they 
do not really seem to go beyond the mere fact of illegal stay.’104 
If one of the three circumstances is found to exist, administrative authorities would prefer to refuse 
VD instead of shortening the VD period. There is no reported case law where national courts changed 
the refusal of VD to shortening the VD period based on the principle of proportionality and the effet 
utile of the Directive. 
The majority of the cases heard by national courts on Article 7(4) RD relate to the lack of evidence 
proving an alleged risk of absconding, thus justifying a refusal of VD, and claims asking for an 
alternative to coercive removal or detention. The TCNs concerned often argued that the administration 
failed to adequately assess the possibility of imposing VD or other alternatives to detention prior to 
ordering detention. National courts’ attempts at assessing the reasons given by the administration for 
finding a risk of absconding are often limited to establish whether the administration has committed a 
manifest error of interpretation (FR). In this case, if the administration does not give the reasons or 
grounds for refusing to confer VD, or if it does not provide the period during which the TCN should 
voluntarily depart, courts will readily quash the administration’s decisions.105  
It seems that following the CJEU judgment in the El Dridi case, courts are readier to assess the 
evidence given by the administration and to balance the risk with the established measures. They also 
more often take into consideration whether less intrusive alternatives might be established based on 
the principle of proportionality. For instance, the Administration Court of Appeal of Nantes
106
 found 
that a TCN not having lawfully entered French territory and having failed to obtain a residence permit 
was not sufficient evidence to establish a risk of absconding that would require a refusal of VD. The 
fact that the TCN concerned had been married to a French national with whom she continued to live, 
during which time she lost her passport, but aimed to regularise her stay in France, was sufficient 
evidence for the Court to find that the administration committed a manifest error of assessment. It 
consequently annulled the decision and decided to confer VD with residence assigned at the place 
where she was staying with her husband. 
1.6 Conclusions – the status quo of the judicial implementation of Article 7 RD 
Although all Member States have implemented Article 7 RD into their national legislation,
107
 and 
thus require the public authorities to confer a period of voluntary departure of a certain time frame, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Return Directive) or his departure to the Member State that is responsible for his application for asylum (according to the 
Dublin regulation). Non-substantial grounds are: The third-country national does not fulfil one or more obligations, laid 
down in chapter 4 of the Aliens Act (i.e. the obligation to report to the authorities on a regular basis); He has 
unsuccessfully applied more than once for a residence permit; He has no permanent residence; He has no sufficient 
resources; He is suspected of or convicted for a crime; He has worked although he was not allowed to do so according to 
the Law. See more details in the Dutch National Report. 
103 Galina Cornelisse. 
104 See the Dutch National Report, p. 4. 
105 See, in particular, the judgments of the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court in Dorofeev, 12/12/2011, and Hamada 
judgment of the same court, 07/03/2012. See also Austrian Federal Administrative Court, G307 2009115-1/2E, 28.7.2014 
and Belgian Council for Alien Law Litigation (CALL), case 97.083 of 13 February 2013.  
106 Judgment of 31st of May 2012, n° 11NT03061. 
107 However Article 7(2) RD is one of the paragraphs that has been less transposed then the other paragraphs, see for instance 
the case of the Czech Republic. 
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practice, several Member States have an established administrative practice whereby no period of VD 
is granted.
108
 This practice is furthermore concerning due to the fact that it occurs also in Member 
States having a one-step procedure, whereby TCNs receive only one decision on the basis of which the 
removal is carried out if the TCN has not previously voluntarily departed. This regrettable 
administrative practice has not, surprisingly, given rise to many challenges before national courts. The 
possible reasons for this limited national jurisprudence can be the TCN lack of information of their 
rights due to lack of translation of the return decision/removal order in a language they understand, 
which can lead to unawareness of their right to a voluntary departure period or expiration of the time 
period for appealing the return decision/removal order. Another reason is the fact that in certain 
Member States (e.g. Cyprus) VD is not considered by national courts as an administrative act that can 
be subjected to judicial review.
109
 
The CJEU’s gives clear indications of the principles of ‘gradualism’ and ‘voluntarism’ in the 
enforcement of the return procedure. These would require national authorities to give precedence to 
the VD measure as a first step in enforcing the return decision. However the VD seems to be the 
exception rather than the rule. In general national courts do not replace the decision of the 
administration with their own. They very often limit themselves to requiring the public authorities to 
provide justified reasons for their refusal to offer VD where they are lacking. Following the El Dridi 
judgment of the CJEU, it seems that national courts are slowly accepting the idea of extending their 
judicial review beyond the mere manifest error(s) committed by the national authorities. They are 
prepared to assess, too, whether the principles of gradualism, individualism and proportionality have 
been respected by the authorities. Significant changes have occurred in the practice of the supreme 
courts of Bulgaria, Italy and Spain, as they align themselves and their interpretation of the RD with 
that established by the CJEU. The national authorities’ decision granting VD has been considered, 
since 2014, by the Italian ‘Corte di Cassazione’ to be an integral part of the RD which is subject to 
full judicial review.
110
 The Spanish Supreme Court changed in 2013 the long established doctrine of 
fine requiring that public authorities follow the Directive as regards the precise steps in the return 
procedure.
111
 The Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court more readily assesses the conformity of 
national legislation and administrative decisions with the RD and the CJEU jurisprudence.
112
 In two 
cases it quashed the administration’s decision refusing a VD period on the basis of inadequate or 
insufficient proof establishing that the TCN represents a danger to national security or public order. 
National courts, in general, more often assessing whether the national administration has taken the VD 
measure into consideration before ordering the removal, provided objective reasons for refusing VD, 
and considered the alternative of imposing obligations during the VD period before ordering pre-
removal detention. If grounds are not given, administrative decisions will be quashed. Contrary to the 
‘acte du government’ doctrine which has so far governed the relations between the judiciary and the 
administration, courts carried out a more intrusive review of the evidence given by the administration. 
They went beyond simply checking whether reasons were given at all justifying an exception from 
Article 7(1). It is to be recalled here that the CJEU emphasised, in the Mahdi judgment, that national 
courts have the authority to take into account the stated facts and evidence adduced by the 
administrative authority, as well as any observations that the third-country national may submit.
113
 
                                                          
108 See for instance, Bulgaria and Belgium. 
109 Tatsiana Balashevich v. Republic of Cyprus through 1. The Interior Minister, 2. The Director of the Archives for 
population and immigration, Supreme Court Case No. 5635/2013, dated 10.07.2013. The claimant’s application for 
suspension of the execution of a return decision was rejected on the ground that the decision of the authorities was not an 
administrative act but merely a non-binding request to leave Cyprus the soonest. See more details in the Cypriot Report. 
110 Judgment no. 437/2014. 
111 Spanish Supreme Court, Roj: STS 988/2013. 
112 Dorofeev, Court Decision no. 12/12/2011; Hamada, Court Decision no. 07/03/2012. 
113 Mahdi, paras 60-64. 
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However, there are also less fortunate examples of jurisprudential practice. In these, not only do the 
national courts show increased deference to the decisions taken by the national authorities, but they 
interpret the administrative act conferring VD as not being subject to judicial review. For instance, the 
Cypriot Supreme court
114
 found that ‘the standard letter which the immigration authorities 
customarily send to all TCNs in an irregular situation requesting them to depart by themselves does 
not constitute an executive administrative act but a mere request of no legal consequence and as such 
it cannot be subjected to judicial review or be suspended through an interim order.’  
The entry into force of the RD and the CJEU’s interpretation of the Directive have led to changes 
in national legislation and jurisprudence of the Member States. But there is still extensive national 
practice preferring removal to voluntary departure, as the administration appears reluctant to allow 
TCNs to organise their own return for fear of absconding and the courts appear unwilling to interfere 
with this practice (see, in particular, CY and HU).  
In spite of positive jurisprudential trends, the National Reports indicate a lack of uniform national 
jurisprudence as regards conformity with the RD and CJEU jurisprudence. There is also only limited 
intervention of the national courts as regards the decisions taken by the administration, often limited to 
assessing manifest errors, without engaging in an assessment of the administration’s compliance with 
the principle of gradualism, individual assessment and proportionality. 
There remains the national practice of automatic imposition of cumbersome obligations to the VD 
measure (IT). This might, at first, seem to respect the voluntarism and gradualism principles essential 
to the return procedure, but, in fact, it establishes disguised coercive measures.  
                                                          
114 Tatsiana Balashevich v. Republic, Case No. 5635/2013, judgement delivered on 10 July 2013. 
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2. Article 8 – Removal115  
In order to terminate the illegal stay of third-country nationals in their territories, Member States 
‘shall issue a return decision’ in accordance with Article 6 RD.116 Although voluntary return should 
remain the preferred option, when the third country national (TCN) does not comply with his 
obligation(s), or when ‘no period for voluntary departure has been granted’, Article 8 RD requires the 
national authorities to take all necessary measures to enforce the obligation to return. Article 8 RD 
establishes the principles and general steps that should be followed by Member States in the 
enforcement of the obligation to return, namely physical transportation out of the Member State. At 
the very core of the Directive, this provision has been much debated and redrafted during the 
legislative process. Its current structure, which differs from the Commission’s initial proposal, can be 
divided as follows: paragraphs one to three address the circumstances in which Member States enforce 
the return decision by ordering the removal, possibly with a separate administrative act or judicial 
decision;
117
 and paragraphs four to six deal with the concrete measures used to carry out the physical 
transportation of the TCN out of the Member State, while respecting the Directive’s requirements.118 
Through this process, an effective forced-return monitoring system must be put in place at national 
level, the modalities being left to Member State discretion.  
So far, 59 judgments relevant for the application and interpretation of Article 8 RD have been 
collected by a dozen Member States and uploaded on the REDIAL database of national case-law.
119
 
Most of these decisions, issued by the highest national courts, deal with the proportionality of the 
measures, pre-removal detention and possible criminalisation of migration-related offences under 
domestic law.  
After having pointed out national particularities in terms of legal implementation, this first section 
will recall the circumstances in which the TCN can be (forcibly) removed from the Member States’ 
territory. Subsequently, the ‘necessary measures’ adopted according to Article 8(1) and (4) RD will be 
specifically addressed: first, with regard to their very purpose of (effectively) returning the person, 
which differs from criminal law measures aimed at punishing and deterring infringing behaviour; 
second, with regard to the proportionality assessment, required by the Return Directive at any stage of 
the return procedure. According to this principle, both administrative and judicial authorities should 
always consider and prefer the least coercive measure available in each individual case, not least 
during the removal process.
120
 
2.1 Return/removal: conceptual and procedural differences 
The eleven national reports show that Article 8 RD has been transposed in all these jurisdictions 
(AT, BE, BG, CZ, FR, DE, HU, IT, NL, ES, CY). A clear comparison between these legal systems is 
                                                          
115 The chapters on Articles 8, 9(2) and 10(2) were drafted by Géraldine Renaudiere. 
116 Without prejudice to exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 to 5 of Article 6 RD.  
117 The Commission’s proposal provided initially for a true ‘two-step’ procedure whereby Member States should first be 
obliged to issue a return decision which would then be executed by means of a removal order in cases where the person 
concerned had not returned voluntarily or where there was a risk of absconding. However, within the Council, several 
Member States expressed concern that this two-step approach would be too bureaucratic and lead to serious procedural 
delays. As a consequence, this approach was abandoned and it was left up to Member States to decide whether a single or 
separate procedure(s) should be applied for returning third-country nationals in irregular stay. See F. Lutz, The 
Negotiations on the Return Directive, p. 49. 
118 Member States are also encouraged to take into account the Common guidelines on security provisions for joint removals 
by air annexed to Decision 2004/573/EC. 
119 See REDIAL website, national case-law database, Article 8 RD. 
120 Article 8(4) should be read in conjunction with Recitals 6 and 10 of the Directive. 
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yet difficult because the concepts used to define a ‘physical transportation out of the Member States’, 
corresponding to the ‘removal’ within the meaning of the Return Directive, vary from country to 
country. In Austria for instance the term ‘Abschiebung’, referring to the enforcement of the return 
decision in the meaning of § 46 of the Aliens Police Act, means ‘deportation.’ Italian and Spanish 
implementing legislation use, meanwhile, the term ‘expulsion.’ In Spain, however ‘deportation’ covers 
not only the return decision but also the removal order. Similarly, in Bulgaria, return decisions and 
removal orders are both contained in a single act called ‘order for coercive taking to the border.’121 In 
practice, most EU countries have opted for a one-step procedure in which the return decision and the 
removal decision are issued in a single (administrative) act
122
 (BE,
123
 BG, ES, FR etc.). Others (AT, 
IT), meanwhile, chose two different acts and/or decisions, in a ‘two-step procedure’.124 Yet such 
distinctions are not always easy to make as they depend on national procedural systems: in Italy, the 
legislator made use of the faculty provided for in Article 8(3) RD, opting for separate decisions for the 
return and the removal order, subject to different legal requirements and distinct judicial reviews.
125
 
By contrast, in Austria, ‘deportation’ enforcing the return decision, does not constitute a formal 
decision. It is still announced by a separate ‘act’ likely to be appealed before an independent 
administrative court.
126
 The choice of procedure, therefore, belongs to Member States, provided that 
procedural safeguards available under Chapter III of the Directive and under other relevant provisions 
of Community and national law are respected. Regardless of whether the Member States adopted the 
‘one-step’ or ‘two step’ return procedure in domestic law, the removal, as set forth in Article 8 RD, 
can only take place when the obligation to return within the period for voluntary departure has not 
been complied with.
127
 
2.2 Borderline between ‘voluntary departure’ and ‘removal’  
It clearly appears from both the Directive
128
 and the CJEU’s case law that a ‘gradation’ of measures 
has to be respected when applying the return procedure, ‘going from measures allowing the person 
concerned the most liberty, namely granting a period for his voluntary departure, to measures which 
restrict that liberty the most, namely pre-removal detention’.129 Therefore, it is not surprising that 
                                                          
121 By comparison, in Hungary, the term ‘return’ does not have a settled meaning in national law: in the context of ‘decision’ 
it means expulsion, while in the context of an ‘obligation’, the term means ‘going-back/return’. See in this regard, N. 
Boldizsár, Hungarian Report on the first package of the Return Directive, p. 1-2. 
122 As provided for in Article 6(6) RD. 
123 In Belgium, Article 8 RD is implemented by Art. 74/15 of the Law of 15 December 1980. However, there is no distinct 
decision determining how the order to leave the territory must be enforced. That enforcement is merely suspended during 
the period for voluntary departure. Likewise, in German law, the removal order obliges the TCN to leave the territory in 
between seven and 30 days: in case of non-compliance, deportation is considered as an ‘executive action’ implementing 
the removal order, but not as a distinct decision (Sec. 59 of the German Residence Act). 
124 See in this regard, EC, evaluation on the application of the Return Directive (2008/115/EC), 2013. 
125 First, an administrative expulsion order is issued by the Prefect, on a case-by-case basis when (1) the foreigner is 
considered as dangerous because of ‘his membership to certain specific categories’ or (2) the foreigner has entered or 
resides in Italy in breach of immigration rules. Then the Questore (police commissioner) in charge of the execution of the 
order adopts a removal order which, since accompaniment to the border implies a restriction on personal freedom, is 
checked and validated by the Justice of the Peace within 48 hours. On this occasion, the judge performs a check on the 
merits, verifying the existence of all conditions of form and substance required for the adoption of both the administrative 
expulsion (decision N. 1) and its enforcement (decision N. 2). See Article 13, para. 5-bis of the consolidated text and A. 
Di Pascale, Italian report of the first package of the Return Directive, pp. 3-4 
126 Indeed, according to the AT synthesis report on the first package of the Return Directive, ‘the Jurisprudence confirms that 
complaints may not only be filed against return decisions but also against the practical enforcement of the return 
decisions by deportation (Maßnahmenbeschwerde).’ See also EC, Evaluation on the application of the Return Directive 
(2008/115/EC), p. 174. 
127 In those cases in which such a period is granted. 
128 E.g. the very order in which provisions are presented in the Directive, from voluntary departure (Art. 7) to removal (Art. 8). 
129 See C-61/11 PPU, El Dridi, ECLI:EU:C:2011:268, paras. 36-41. 
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Article 8(1) RD calls upon Member States to enforce the return decision in two specific circumstances, 
namely: 
- if no period for voluntary departure has been granted in accordance with Article 7(4); 
- if the obligation to return has not been complied with within the period for voluntary 
departure granted in accordance with Article 7.  
As to Article 8(2) RD, it prevents Member States from enforcing the return decision as long as the 
period for voluntary departure is still ‘running’: unless a risk as referred to in Article 7(4) RD arises 
during that period.  
In the Czech Republic, a period for voluntary departure is granted ‘in every return case’ so that the 
first scenario envisaged by the Directive is not likely to occur. In Spain, Article 64(1) of the 
Immigration Act 4/2000 distinguishes between the ordinary procedure (procedimiento ordinario) and 
the urgent procedure (procedimiento preferente). It states that if the TCN has not left the territory 
within the period for voluntary departure or if the urgent procedure applies (in which no period for 
voluntary departure is granted), the TCN is forcibly removed from Spanish territory in less than 72 
hours.
130
 By contrast, Austrian law properly implements Article 8(1) and (2) RD, read in conjunction 
with Article 7(4): it provides indeed for the deportation of the TCN, who did not leave the territory 
within the time limit granted for voluntary departure. It also provides for deportation when there are 
‘certain indications’ that the person does not intend to leave the country, or when the supervised 
departure is deemed necessary due to considerations of public security and public order.
131
 
2.3 Necessary measures to enforce the return decision  
Article 8(1) RD requires Member States to take ‘all necessary measures’ in order to enforce the 
return decision. This should be read in conjunction with paragraph 4 of the said provision (namely the 
use, as a last resort, of ‘coercive measures’ to carry out the removal of third-country nationals who 
resist removal). Here ‘measures’ and ‘coercive measures’ have been duly defined by the CJEU as any 
intervention which leads, in an effective and proportionate manner, to the return of the person 
concerned.
132
 The concrete modalities, (the ‘how’), are left up to Member State legislation and 
administrative practice.  
2.3.1 Excluding criminal law measures for infringements of migration-related legal norms  
The Return Directive does not preclude EU Member States from having competence in criminal 
matters in the area of illegal immigration and illegal stays.
133
 In principle, national authorities are free 
to lay down penal sanctions in relation to infringements of migration rules and to define in domestic 
law which types of infringements of migration rules are ‘criminalised’.134 This is aimed, inter alia, at 
dissuading TCNs from remaining illegally on the Member State territory. The CJEU recalled, 
however, that such sanctions ‘do not contribute to the carrying through of the removal which that 
                                                          
130 Unless ‘removal’ cannot be enforced due to specific circumstances. 
131 In case of illegal entry, a deportation can take place immediately (within 72 hours) after the TCNs apprehension at the 
border. See U. Brandl, Austrian Report on the first package of the Return Directive, p. 6. 
132 C-329/11, Achughbabian, ECLI:EU:C: 2011:807, para. 36. 
133 C-61/11 PPU, El Dridi, para. 54 
134 In this regard, criminal law measures for migration related offences should not be confused with ‘common’ criminal law 
and extradition cases, for which Member States may decide not to apply the Directive to certain categories of third 
country nationals. In accordance with Article 2(2)(b)RD, such derogation must be made clear in advance in the national 
legislation implementing the Directive, otherwise developing no legal effects. Unlike ‘migration-related offences’, the 
criminal law cases envisaged by this provision are those typically considered as crimes in the national legal orders of the 
Member States; such as conviction for drug trafficking, offences against the provisions of the national law on narcotics 
(Filev and Osmani, C-292/14), murder etc. 
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procedure is intended to achieve […] and do not therefore constitute a ‘measure’ or a ‘coercive 
measure’ within the meaning of Article 8 of Directive 2008/115.’135 They are not as such incompatible 
with the objectives of the Return Directive, as long as they do not compromise its application and do 
not prevent a return decision from being made and implemented in full compliance with the conditions 
set out in the Directive.
136
  
In practice, migration-related offences are quite often criminalised by Member State legislation, 
punishable either by a fine (IT, ES), a prison sentence (NL, CZ, CY) or even immediate expulsion 
(IT). Whereas some particular issues have been referred to the CJEU in the context of preliminary 
rulings, uncertainties remain at national level with regard to some of the Court’s findings. This has led 
to diverging interpretations from judicial authorities among surveyed Member States.  
First, as regards the possibility of ordering fines and house arrests, the Court has ruled that a 
(proportionate) financial penalty for illegal stay under criminal law was compatible with the Directive, 
if it does not impede return. Likewise a home detention order was not declared incompatible, provided 
that it, too, does not impede return and so long as it comes to an end as soon as the physical 
transportation of the individual concerned out of the Member State is made possible.
137
  
This is notably illustrated by the ‘security package’ adopted in Italy in the years 2008 and 2009, 
strengthening the criminal law framework against migrants in irregular stay and punishing by a fine 
the offence of the ‘irregular entry and stay’ of third-country nationals. Not invalidated per se by the 
CJEU in Sagor, this legislation has yet to be read alongside the Return Directive and must not 
contravene its application and deprive it of its effectiveness.
138
 
This situation must however be distinguished from the current practice applicable in Spain where, 
pursuant to Article 53(1) (a) of Immigration Act 4/2000, an ‘illegal stay’ on Spanish territory is 
punishable by a criminal sanction. With regard to the principle of proportionality and when 
aggravating circumstances exist (as defined by Spanish case law), expulsion can be resorted to instead 
of a financial penalty. According to the Spanish report, the fine remains the sentence most often used 
in cases of illegal stay, unless ‘negative factors’ (such as the lack of documentation or previous 
criminal detentions or non-compliance with a previous return decision) can be observed in an 
individual case.
139
 This practice, developed between 2005 and 2008 did not change until 2013, despite 
several legislative modifications. It has, however, been recently challenged in Zaizoune, in which the 
CJEU declared such legislation incompatible with Article 6 RD
140
 as it provides, in the event of third-
country nationals illegally staying in the territory, for, depending on circumstances, either a fine or 
removal, since the two measures are mutually exclusive.
141
 While the CJEU recognised in Sagor that 
Member States might impose financial sanctions, as criminal measures, to irregular TCNs during the 
course of the return procedure, it did not acknowledge such penalties as a ‘substitute’ for return or 
expulsion; the national legislation which foresees, in the event of illegal stay, for either a fine or 
removal, is, indeed, incompatible with the Return Directive since it undermines its effectiveness. The 
question as to whether such financial penalties could be considered as ‘more favourable national 
provisions’, in the meaning of Article 4(3) RD, has also been addressed by the Court in Zaizoune, 
                                                          
135 C-329/11, Achughbabian, para. 37 
136 C-430/11, Sagor, ECLI:EU:C:2012:777, para. 36.  
137 C-430/11, Sagor, para. 43-47. 
138 Yet in light of this Judgment, Italian Law n. 67/2014 turned criminal offences into administrative measures as with 
irregular first entry into the territory, but it maintained the criminal nature of individual acts violating administrative 
measures and/or hampering the return process. 
139 C. Gortazar Rotaeche, Spanish report on the first package of the Return Directive, p. 4 
140 Read in conjunction with Article 8(1) and Article 4(2) and (3) RD 
141 Which was not the case of the Spanish ‘doctrine of the fine’, See C-38/14, Zaizoune, 23 April 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:260, para. 41. 
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which answered in the negative. The Court recalled in this regard the need for such provisions to be 
compatible with the Directive and its objectives.
142
  
Second, Member States may also resort to imprisonment under their domestic law to sanction a 
migration-related offence committed by TCNs. But here again the application of the Return Directive 
needs to be taken into account, especially its practical implementation. In El Dridi, the CJEU stated 
that the Directive precludes Member States from imposing imprisonment under national criminal law 
on the sole grounds of illegal stay ‘before or during carrying out return procedures’, since this would 
delay return. Concretely, due to its conditions and methods of application, a custodial sentence would, 
according to the Court, run the risk to ‘jeopardizing the attainment of the objective pursued by the 
directive, namely the establishment of an effective policy of removal and repatriation of illegally 
staying third country nationals’.143 Consequently, the only permitted deprivation of liberty in the return 
context is, in the Court’s view, ‘detention’ for the purpose of removal under Article 15 RD. 
The French legal system has been amended
144
 in order to comply with the CJEU’s case-law on 
criminal imprisonment: irregular stays have been ‘decriminalised’ and the previous system of police 
custody (garde à vue) has been replaced by an administrative ‘retenue’ for a maximum of sixteen 
hours in order to verify the nature of the person’s stay.145 The Czech Supreme Court, meanwhile, ruled 
in 2014, that a suspended two-year prison sentence imposed on a TCN who did not comply with the 
return decision
146
 was compatible with the Return Directive and corresponding European case-law. 
Referring notably to El Dridi, the Supreme Court considered that the use of criminal law is admitted 
when (less coercive) administrative measures, such as the issuance of a return decision accompanied 
by a two-year entry ban, have failed in forcing a foreign national to leave the country. Moreover, from 
the Court’s point of view, the fact that the prison sentence was suspended was likely to dissuade the 
TCN from staying illegally on Czech territory, while allowing him to comply with the return decision 
by leaving the country in short order.
147
  
In Cyprus illegal entry or illegal stays in the country are not punishable by imprisonment. 
However, Article 12 and 19 of Cypriot law provides for prison sentences against ‘prohibited 
immigrants’, ranging from twelve months to three years, in specific circumstances: if the TCN does 
not enter or leave Cyprus through an approved port; if the TCN enters by sea without the Chief 
Immigration Officer’s (CIO) permission; or if the TCN enters by air without immediately reporting 
to the nearest authority; makes a false statement as regards the purpose of his/her stay; has forged 
documents or issues false certificate; refuses to answer or deliberately lies to the authorities etc. 
According to these provisions, prison sentences for these immigration-related offences might apply 
to TCNs covered by the Return Directive only when: (1) the maximum period of detention provided 
by Article 15RD has expired and there is no more reasonable prospect of removal due to the lack of 
a country of destination; (2) the TCN re-enters the Republic of Cyprus unlawfully after having being 
obliged to leave by return proceedings. In practice, however, Cypriot administrative bodies and 
tribunals tend to limit the scope and ambit of the CJEU’s landmark judgments regarding the 
                                                          
142 C-38/14, Zaizoune, ECLI:EU:C:2015:260, para. 38: ‘[…] Given the objective pursued by that directive, as recalled in 
paragraph 30 above, and also the Member States’ obligations which are evident from Articles 6(1) and 8(1) of that 
directive, there is no such compatibility where national legislation provides for a mechanism such as that set out in 
paragraph 37 above’.  
143 C-61/11 PPU, El Dridi, para. 59 
144 French Law n. 2012-1560 of 31 December 2012 (See H. LABAYLE, M. GARCIA, French report on the first package of 
the Return Directive). 
145 During the TCNs deprivation of liberty, French immigration authorities have yet to comply with procedural safeguards 
and the fundamental rights of the person concerned (right to a prompt information, assistance by a lawyer and interpreter 
if needed, medical examination, contacts with family members etc.). 
146 Indeed, according to Article 337(1) (b) of the Czech Criminal Code, ‘obstructing the enforcement of an administrative 
decision’ is a criminal offence likely to lead to up to two years in prison. 
147 Czech Supreme Court (highest judicial authority in civil and criminal matters), case n. 7, 500/2014, 7 May 2014.  
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criminalisation of irregular stay: indeed, they usually distinguish, on the basis of the Aliens and 
Immigration Law, among the TCNs staying in the country irregularly. There are those who benefit 
from the protection granted by the Return Directive and there are those who are ‘prohibited 
immigrants’, i.e. TCNs who had been previously convicted of murder or criminal offence, no matter 
how minor the crime or how long the prison sentence issued against them. Relying on the principle 
of separation of powers and the discretionary power of administrative authorities, national courts are 
usually reluctant to interfere with immigration authorities’ discretion when regulating the entry and 
stay of third-country nationals. Therefore, referring to Article 2(2) (b) of the Return Directive, 
judicial courts frequently accept the argument according to which an applicant subject to a return 
order, as a result of criminal law sanctions, is not entitled to avail himself of the protection 
conferred by the Directive.  
Finally, as regards the criminal measures imposed later on,
148
 the CJEU has recently been called 
upon to clarify its case-law on the circumstances in which a return procedure is deemed ‘achieved’ or 
‘applied’. In accordance with the second indent of the Achughbabian Judgment, the Court is indeed 
expected to better define the moment in which Member States are free to impose imprisonment on 
TCNs illegally present in their territory, without there being any justified grounds for non-return.
149
  
In two cases involving the same foreign national,
150
 the Czech Supreme Court had to deal with this 
crucial issue. It was obliged to assess in what circumstances the enforcement of the return decision had 
to be considered as practically impossible. In both cases, the claimant was found guilty of non-
compliance with the return procedure, yet only one of the lower courts sentenced him to ten months 
imprisonment. The person repeatedly failed to respect the period for voluntary departure; indeed, he 
remained in the Czech Republic despite successive return decisions, several detention measures and a 
ten-year entry-ban. The Supreme Court concluded that, in those circumstances, the return procedure 
could be considered applied, as everything had been done by the authorities to remove the TCN, 
though the measures had failed. In accordance with its previous case law, the Supreme Court stated 
that Czech law clearly indicated that the failure to respect a decision on administrative expulsion could 
be sanctioned by criminal law. Here, as the foreign national repeatedly failed to respect administrative 
measures and previous criminal penalties, the Supreme Court considered that the sentence of 
imprisonment could apply as a dissuasive measure, without infringing the Return Directive. However, 
in the present case, the foreign national was considered ‘stateless’ since the authorities of his country 
of origin (Georgia) refused to consider him as a Georgian citizen and to provide him with travel 
documents. The Supreme Court concluded that a ‘dissuasive’ criminal sanction was not suitable 
because the applicant was not personally responsible for the situation, and that, due to the lack of 
recognition and travel documents, his return to Georgia was practically impossible. By comparison, 
the Dutch Supreme Court seems to provide a stricter interpretation of the moment from which it can 
be resorted to national criminal sanctions. In that sense, it formulated three cumulative conditions 
according to which the criminal code might apply to irregular stays: (a) when the TCN does not have a 
valid reason for his non-return; (b) when all steps of the procedure as foreseen in the Return Directive 
have been applied; (c) when the judgment provides a well-argued motivation for the full application of 
the return decision in the individual case. As an example, it was ruled that a TCN who was 
interviewed eleven times, followed by seven attempts to present him to the Iranian Embassy, subject 
to repeated detention, and who showed uncooperative conduct as regards IOM assistance, might stand 
as a fully achieved return procedure.
151
 
                                                          
148 In theory, after the application of the return procedure in the meaning of the Return Directive 
149 C-329/11, Achughbabian, ECLI:EU:C: 2011:807, para. 48-51 
150 Case No. 8 Tdo 230/2014 of 26 March 2014 and case No. 4Tdo 354/2014. See D. KOSAR, Czech Report on the first 
package of the Return Directive, pp. 8-9.  
151 See Dutch Supreme Court, case n. 12/05522, 3 December 2013. G. Cornelisse, in cooperation with J. Bouwman, Dutch 
Report on the first package of the Return Directive.  
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Until recently, it was unclear whether Member States could resort to national criminal law 
measures in the event that a person left the territory, but re-entered later in violation of a valid entry-
ban. According to the Dutch Supreme Court, backed by other Member States,
152
 this situation differs 
from the situation of first illegal entry as the former does not require the competent authorities to 
check whether the return procedure has been fully applied in the first place. In the case of re-entry to 
the Netherlands, a prison sentence can be applied, under the supervision of a criminal judge: in fact, a 
criminal judge is the only competent authority to rule on the criminal consequences of the violation of 
an entry-ban; the administrative judge has control over the lawfulness of the decision imposing the 
entry ban. Unlike the Advocate General in Celaj, who emphasised the irrelevance of any difference 
between ‘the various situations in which a foreign national might find himself, according to whether 
his presence in national territory is the result of unlawful entry or re-entry following an earlier removal 
decision’,153 the Dutch interpretation has been endorsed by the CJEU. In fact, the Court recently stated 
in the same case that Directive 2008/115 does not exclude such criminal law sanctions against illegally 
staying third-country nationals ‘for whom the application of the procedure established by that directive 
resulted in their being returned and who then re-enter the territory of a Member State in breach of an 
entry ban, provided that such ban complies with the conditions provided in Article 11 RD […] a 
matter which is for the referring court to determine.’154 
2.3.2 ‘Gradation’ and proportionality: from the least to the most intrusive measures 
The CJEU highlighted in El Dridi that a gradation of measures has to be kept in mind by national 
authorities when enforcing the return decision: these should match the stages of the return procedure 
in the Return Directive. ‘Going from the measure which allows the person concerned the most liberty, 
namely granting a period for his voluntary departure, to measures which restrict that liberty the most, 
namely detention in a specialised facility’, such a gradation of measures must always be assessed in 
the terms of the principle of proportionality.
155
  
Although a forced return by national authorities necessarily implies elements of coercion,
156
 the 
principle of proportionality, as embodied by the CJEU, concretely obliges Member State to use the 
least intrusive measure at all stages of the procedure. Resorting to detention prior to removal is only 
one of the possible measures which may be used by Member States to enforce a return decision. 
Repeatedly considered as a measure of last resort by the Return Directive, pre-removal detention of 
irregular TCNs only applies in situations in which its use is the only way to make sure that the return 
process can be prepared and the removal process carried out. Additionally, according to Article 15 
                                                          
152 Requesting for a CJEU preliminary ruling, the Tribunal of Florence (Italy) considered the situation of re-entering to be in 
breach of previous entry ban as a permitted derogation from the RD, and not prohibited by the CJEU, since the factual 
situation was distinct from the judgments in El Dridi (C-61/11 PPU, EU:C:2011:268) and Achughbabian (C‑329/11, 
EU:C:2011:807), see the Celaj case. 
153 C-290/14, Celaj, AG opinion rendered on 28 April 2015. In paras. 44 and 56, the AG refers to Article 2(a) RD according 
to which Member States may decide not to apply the Directive to those ‘or who are apprehended or intercepted by the 
competent authorities in connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border of a Member 
State’. By doing so, he seems to suggest that his reasoning applies, without exception, to all cases in which the person 
illegally stays after being re-entered in breach of a valid entry ban. However, it might not be the same for every re-entry 
into Member States’ territories, leading to immediate interception at the borders, when Article 2(a) RD has been 
interpreted/implemented at national level as precluding the application of the Return Directive in such cases.  
154 C-290/14, Celaj, ECLI:EU:C:2015:640, para. 30. In this regard the Court distinguished the circumstances of the case in 
the main proceedings from those in the cases that led to the judgments in El Dridi (C‑61/11 PPU, EU:C:2011:268) and 
Achughbabian (C‑329/11, EU:C:2011:807) in which illegally staying third-country nationals of the third countries 
concerned were subject to a first return procedure in the Member State in question (para. 28) 
155 C-61/11, El Dridi, para. 41 
156 This statement is shared by several participating Member States, as indicated in the FR, HU and NL synthesis reports. 
Within this context, the Dutch Council of State has ruled that the concept of removal in the meaning of the Dutch Aliens 
Act encompasses all these cases in which coercion is used to remove the third country national from the Netherlands. In 
that sense, the return of a TCN with the assistance of the IOM cannot be covered by such definition.  
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RD, any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only maintained as long as removal 
arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence. 
Yet in practice, pre-removal detention remains a coercive measure frequently used by EU Member 
States when enforcing the return decision and preparing removal. As an example, Article 124(1) of the 
Czech ALA entitles the Aliens police to detain prior to removal a foreign national who: did not leave 
Czech territory within the period set by the return decision; or who has seriously violated the 
obligation arising from the imposition of special measures. It does not appear from the report whether 
additional assessment is made by the Czech authorities as regards potential alternative measures to be 
applied, despite these circumstances. In Hungarian law, detention based on Article 54 of the amended 
Act II of 2007 can be ordered, inter alia, to ‘implement removal of those who have refused to ‘leave 
the country’. In French, German and Italian legislation, amendments have been made in order to 
comply with the Return Directive as regards the adoption of pre-removal coercive measures: Article L. 
551-1 of the French CESEDA states that the measure of ‘assignation à résidence’ (house arrest) must 
be preferred over detention when the TCN provides sufficient guarantees that he or she will appear.
157
 
A new statutory rule is about to modify the German Residence Act on pre-removal detention in order 
to better define objective criteria according to which a ‘risk of absconding’ exists in the situation of a 
third-country national subject to return procedures.
158
 In Italy, while waiting for the validation of the 
removal order by the Justice of the Peace, the amended legislative decree provides that the TCN is 
either detained in a CIE (‘centro di identificazione ed espulsione’) or subject to an alternative measure. 
In practice, however, detention tends to remain the preferred option in all cases where it is not possible 
to carry out the expulsion immediately. Available case-law suggests that alternative measures are 
rarely adopted.
159
 
In Cyprus, the Supreme Court condemned, in 2010, the Reviewing Authority’s way of detaining 
and deporting rejected asylum seekers immediately upon the issuance of the negative decision. Such 
actions were severely criticized as it denies the applicant the right to a full judicial review of the 
rejecting decision.
160
 However, it seems that this practice continues despite the Court’s judgment. 
The Return Directive does not give an exhaustive range of alternatives to be considered by Member 
States before ordering detention: some of the obligations aimed at avoiding the risk of absconding 
provided by Article 7(3) RD may, however, be seen as potential – and less intrusive measures – to be 
adopted in order to enforce the return, even beyond the period for voluntary departure.
161
 
                                                          
157 Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile, recently amended by Law n°2015-925 of 29 July 2015.  
158 German Amendment to the Residence Act, adopted by the Parliament on 2 July 2015, reorganizing the grounds for 
detention on the basis of previous national case-law. It will notably provide for a list of objective criteria likely to define 
and to indicate a ‘risk of absconding’ from the TCN staying irregularly on the territory and subject to return procedures: 
e.g. The TCN who deceives the authorities about their identity, violate their obligation to cooperate and to comply with 
administrative decisions, or who has spent a substantial amount of money to enter the country etc.) 
159 In the meaning of Article 14, para. 1 of the Consolidated Text, in cases where it has not been granted a deadline for 
voluntary departure and expulsion cannot be immediately enforced, the competent authority shall proceed to detention in 
a centre for identification and expulsion. The way this provision is drafted marks, therefore, a reversal in comparison to 
the logic pursued by the Directive: the residual measure (i.e. detention) is mentioned in the first rank and only in the 
subsequent paragraph the instruments to avoid detention are indicated. Being a mere faculty of the administration, 
subsidiary to the main option of detention, a particular motivation regarding the non-application of alternative measures 
does not appear to be requested. See A. Di Pascale, Italian report, Article 8 RD and the Italian country report – 
CONTENTION. 
160 See CY Supreme Court, Leonie Marlyse Yombia Ngassam v. Republic of Cyprus, 20 august 2010. There is no officially 
declared policy as to when the option of voluntary departure/other alternative measure is granted, but it appears that this 
option is not automatically granted to all TCNs against whom deportation orders have been issued. In fact it is very rarely 
granted to rejected asylum seekers who do not have children attending school in Cyprus.  
161 Examples might include regular reporting to the authorities, deposit of an adequate financial guarantee, submission of 
documents, obligation to stay at a certain place… See in this regard CONTENTION synthesis report – Alternatives to 
detention, p. 28  
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Besides the very gradation of measures, proportionality may also imply, in the light of Bulgarian 
case-law, the obligation for administrative authorities to ‘serve’ the removal order in a reasonable 
period of time after its issuance. In that sense, the Supreme Administrative Court has ruled that 
removing the TCN five years after issuing the removal order, without any consideration of changes in 
the personal situation of the TCN, made the removal unlawful and was in breach of the basic 
principles of the administrative procedure (lawfulness, rapidity, proportionality, procedural 
economy…).162  
2.4 Physical transportation out of Member States  
In line with the previous section, when carrying out the removal, Article 8(4) RD explicitly stresses 
the exceptional nature of coercive measures to be used in the case of resistance from the TCN. In 
accordance with Recital 13, the use of coercive measures is subject to the principles of proportionality, 
effectiveness and shall never exceed reasonable force. In addition, such measures shall be 
implemented as provided for in national legislation, in accordance with fundamental rights and with 
due respect for the dignity and physical integrity of the TCN. 
From a practical point of view, authorities have to bear in mind that the situation of a third 
country national may evolve over time. The same return procedure can therefore be characterised by 
both voluntary and coercive elements. For instance, if a returnee, who is subject to 
removal/detention, changes his or her attitude and shows willingness to cooperate and to depart 
voluntarily, Member States are encouraged (and entitled) to show flexibility: this might be by 
considering subsequent voluntary travelling without physical force. In line with the general 
principles of EU law, all decisions taken under the Return Directive must be decided on a case-by-
case basis; Member States are, therefore, encouraged to take personal and individual circumstances 
into account all through the return procedure. 
As far as removal by air is concerned, Article 8(5) RD establishes that Member States shall take 
into consideration the Common Guidelines on security provisions for joint removals by air laid down 
in annex to Decision 2004/573/EC. There is, unfortunately, little case law about the transportation of 
third country nationals out of Member States. In the Netherlands, though there is no particular case-
law on Article 8(4) RD, requirements of proportionality and ‘reasonable use of force’ were codified in 
Dutch Law and policy even before the implementation of the Return Directive. In that sense, the 
Aliens Circulaire
163
 pleads for suitable and necessary coercive measures. For instance, if a third 
country national is forced to board a plane, the captain has to be informed. After the doors of the plane 
are shut, coercive measures may only be used with the captain’s consent. More generally, on the basis 
of formal law, coercive measures in the context of removal may only apply if it is required by 
particular circumstances: on the grounds of a risk of absconding or because there is danger for the 
safety/life of the third country national, for the person carrying out the removal and escorting him, or 
for a third person. Coercive measures can also be resorted to when there is a risk of serious 
disturbance of public order. However, coercive measures can only be used if the health of the third 
country national will not be harmed. Concerning the use of handcuffs,
164
 the Council of State has ruled 
that it has to be made clear in the administrative report that the use of handcuffs for that purpose was 
                                                          
162 Case Suzana Azatovna Minasyan, 13 June 2012. See V. Ilariva, Bulgarian Report on the first package of the Return 
Directive, p. 5. Moreover, national courts considered that such ‘late measures’ without a fresh consideration of the 
personal situation of the third country national concerned were unlawful because they ‘entirely compromise the purpose 
of the law’ being ‘the guarantee of the observance of the legal order established in the country with regard to the 
residence of foreign citizens while respecting their rights’. 
163 Article 23(a) of the Ambtsinstructie voor de Politie, Ambtenaren van de Koninklijke Marechaussee en andere 
opsporingsambtenaren). 
164 Though national case-law here is mainly about displacements from courtrooms to administrative offices. 
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proportionate.
165
 In Hungary, on the other hand, case law regarding physical transportation exists but 
might appear a bit confusing as for the reasons invoked to justify forced return under ‘official escort’. 
In a given case, a Tanzanian national was denied a period for voluntary departure because of a lack of 
valid passport, financial resources and travel ticket. However, the removal order issued by 
immigration authorities was based on different legal grounds, namely Article 65(1) (c) and (2) of Act 
II of 2007, providing for a forced return for reasons of national security, public security and public 
policy. The applicant had no criminal record and expressed his willingness to leave EU territory. But 
the Administrative and Labour Court of Budapest relied on the specific circumstances of the case as 
showing lack of cooperation of the applicant and a constant disregard of Hungarian laws: the TCN did 
not take steps to regularise his stay, had no valid passport and entered Hungary ‘illegally’ before being 
granted an authorisation to stay. Consequently, his unattended travel was found dangerous for the 
safety of air traffic, justifying his forced return from Hungarian territory.
166
  
Finally, Article 8(6) RD provides for an effective forced-return monitoring system to be set up by 
Member States when carrying out removals. Of the eleven national reports, only the Austrian report 
refers to the Aliens Police Act, stipulating that departures have to be systematically monitored and that 
the practical enforcement of the return decision by deportation is subject to a specific judicial review: 
deportations are monitored by human rights rapporteurs, who attend the first interview of the TCN and 
monitor the removal process from, in principle, the ‘information phase’ until the arrival of the person 
in the country of destination. A report has then to be submitted to the Ombudsperson, up to one week 
after deportation. In Cyprus, no effective forced-return monitoring system has been established so far, 
though the Ombudsman was initially appointed as a monitoring body for returns by a decision from 
the Council of Ministers in 2013. However, no specific budget was allocated to this function so that 
monitoring activities never took place in practice.
167
 In 2011, the Commission reported that six 
European countries did not have a ‘return monitoring’ system in place nor was one planned (including 
BG, IT, FR, DE). Another five, meanwhile, had initiated legislation (including HU and CY) which 
would subsequently introduce a system. In seventeen countries, a system was planned or in place as a 
result of the Directive.
168
  
                                                          
165 Dutch council of State, 201010863/1/V3 and 201102621/1/V3. 
166 See. K. 31.962/2013/6, N. Boldizsár, Hungarian Report on the first package of the Return Directive, p. 8. 
167 See N. Trimikliniotis, Cypriot report on the first package of the Return Directive, p. 3. 
168 See European Commission, Evaluation Report on the application of the Return Directive (2008/115/EC), 2013, p. 97.  
In France, there is no specific body in charge of monitoring the return process. The same is true of Spain where the Spanish 
Immigration Act contains no reference to the specific establishment of an effective forced-return monitoring system. 
However, according to Spanish NGO’s ‘Pueblos Unidos,’ there is in practice an informal monitoring of the return policy 
on the part of the Spanish Ombudsman. Finally, in Germany, although forced returns are within the competence of the 
alien authorities of the Länder, there is no general practice or judicial review of a monitoring procedure.  
European Synthesis Report on the Termination of Illegal Stay (Articles 7 to 11 of Directive 2008/115/EC) 
REDIAL RR 2016/01 37 
3. Article 9(2) RD
169
 – Postponement of removal  
When proposing this provision, the Commission intended to provide clear examples of 
circumstances likely to postpone removal,
170
 whilst avoiding an exhaustive list of situations which 
would have certainly led to a narrower interpretation. Despite Parliament’s opposition, initial 
obligations were progressively softened; turning the provision, particularly its second paragraph, into a 
compilation of non-binding ‘may’ instead of ‘shall’ clauses.171 Article 9(1) RD now establishes an 
obligation to postpone the removal of a third country national which would violate the principle of 
non-refoulement or the suspensory effect of a judicial remedy granted in accordance with Article 13(2) 
RD. But Member States may decide to postpone removal for other reasons, for an appropriate period 
of time, taking individual circumstances into account. The Return Directive provides two concrete 
examples: namely (a) the third-country national’s physical state or mental capacity; (b) technical 
reasons, such as a lack of transport capacity, failure of removal due to a lack of identification.
172
 
However, this is not an exhaustive list; Article 9 RD encourages Member States to react flexibly to 
any newly arising or newly discovered circumstances justifying the postponement of removal. In this 
regard, Member States remain free to provide, both in their national legislation and administrative 
practice, additional circumstances likely to ‘delay’ or impede the removal of a third country national. 
They can also define the concrete modalities of any such postponement.  
As for the circumstances of postponement, physical state and mental capacity of the person 
concerned has been largely transposed by the reporting Member States, but either interpreted in a very 
strict manner or applied at different stages of the return procedure. 
According to the Austrian Aliens Police Act (§ 46), the physical state and mental capacity of the 
person are taken into account when determining whether the person should be removed or not. 
Meanwhile, his or her stay is tolerated on Austrian territory. In the Czech Republic, only Article 9(1) 
has been properly implemented through Articles 169(5) and 179(1) ALA. Foreigners ‘who were 
refused an entry’ to the Czech territory are not obliged, pursuant to Article 10 ALA, to leave the 
country immediately: if there is an immediate threat for their life due to an accident, a sudden illness; 
if withholding of emergency medical care would cause permanent pathological changes; or when it is 
necessary to provide emergency medical care, e.g. in case of childbirth. It remains, however, unclear 
whether this category of people is also granted a toleration visa during the postponement period, as is 
the case when serious reasons prohibit the enforcement of expulsion measures.
173
 In France, national 
legislation prohibits the expulsion of TCNs with serious health problems which need to be treated in 
order to prevent exceptionally dangerous consequences for the person’s health, unless medical care is 
                                                          
169 Article 9(2) RD reads as follows: ‘Member States may postpone removal for an appropriate period taking into account the 
specific circumstances of the individual case. Member States shall in particular take into account: (a) the third-country 
national’s physical state or mental capacity; (b) technical reasons, such as lack of transport capacity, or failure of the 
removal due to lack of identification.’ 
170 NB: postponement of removal must be distinguished from the period for voluntary departure, as provided for by Article 7 
RD: while the latter provision grants a ‘period of grace’ allowing the TCN to prepare and ‘self-manage’ his departure 
from the territory, Article 9 RD relates to those cases in which the obligation to return must be enforced by the State 
(because voluntary departure is not possible or indicated). That being said, the circumstances likely to extend the period 
for voluntary departure can be substantially similar or identical to the ones leading to the postponement of removal. 
171 F. Lutz, The Negotiations on the Return Directive, p. 53. 
172 It must be stressed that this synthesis report, as well as the national case law collected, mainly focus on the second 
paragraph of Article 9 RD, given the abundant case-law of the European Court of Human rights on the principle of non-
refoulement and the suspensory effect of judicial remedies, both requiring mandatory postponement. That will be studied 
more closely under the second package addressing Chapter III and the procedural safeguards. By contrast, according to 
Article 9(2) RD, Member States are left with wider discretion when appreciating technical and medical capacities 
justifying postponement of removal, as well as the practical implementation, provided that relevant safeguards and 
provisions for each individual decision are respected. 
173 See Article 33(1)(a) ALA. 
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likely to be provided in the country of destination. In French case law, these conditions are strictly 
assessed: when challenging the removal decision: the applicant has to demonstrate the exceptional 
gravity for his or her health and the lack of appropriate treatment in the country of destination.
174
 
Additionally, an advisory opinion is issued by the Regional Health Agencies when there are sufficient 
reasons to believe that the health conditions of the TCN would prevent his return, even though this 
opinion is not binding for the Prefect in charge of the case. In Italy, Article 9(2) RD is not properly 
implemented, but Article 35 TU
175
 indirectly states that even foreign nationals who are in a country 
illegally are entitled to receive urgent and essential care in hospital in the case of illness, accident or 
pregnancy. Implicitly, the removal can therefore be suspended when the person might suffer 
irreparable harm. In that sense, the Italian provision covers not only emergency cases, but also 
continuative treatments; the (un)availability of medicines and health care in the country of origin is 
also taken into account. In the Netherlands, Article 9(2) has been partially implemented by Article 64 
of Aliens Act. This article states that medical impediments to removal (e.g. the health of the TCN or 
his family members preventing them from carrying out the removal as the journey would not be safe) 
lead to a legal stay of the person in the Netherlands, for as long as the medical problem lasts. There 
must, however, be a medical emergency.
176
 Finally, Article 18PA(2) implements in Cyprus the second 
paragraph of Article 9 RD, while leaving the determination of the appropriate period of postponement 
at the discretion of the Director.  
As for technical difficulties and lack of identification, the Italian legal system does not expressly 
provide for a postponement of removal. It does, though, consider these situations as ‘objective 
impediments’ to removal. When such circumstances occur, the person is either detained in a CIE (Centre 
for identification or expulsion) or is granted the possibility of leaving the country within seven days, 
following the adoption of an administrative order: this is particularly done in cases in which the alien can 
be concretely accepted in a country of destination, but when the prospect of enforcing the removal no 
longer exists. In Cyprus, if the returnee has no travel documents or if the immigration authorities wait 
for the issuance of such documents by a third-country’s Embassy, the removal can be postponed by the 
Director. Removal is also likely to be postponed when the airline company refuses to transport a person 
who strongly resists or who is unwilling to cooperate to his or her physical transportation.  
As for the postponement period, some of the Member States resorted to the faculty provided by 
Article 9(3) RD to impose obligations set out in Article 7(3) RD during the postponement period. In 
France, even when the TCN is objectively unable to leave the country or cannot go to his country or 
to another one, the French authorities may issue a residence arrest (assignation à residence) for a 
maximum period of six months (renewable). In Cyprus, obligations under Article 7(3) RD can only 
be imposed at the occasion of a facultative postponement in the meaning of Article 9(2) RD, i.e. in 
circumstances other than non-refoulement and the suspensory effect of judicial remedies. As regards 
pre-removal detention, in cases of persistent postponement, the Czech Supreme Administrative 
Court also recalled that the period referred to in Article 15(5) RD (six months) could only be 
extended when there was a lack of cooperation on the part of the third-country national concerned 
(regardless of any additional ‘objective’ impediments).177 
                                                          
174 See e.g. CAA, Lyon, 23 April 2015, H. Labayle and M. Garcia, French report on the first package of the Return Directive.  
175 Distinct national provision. 
176 However, even when a permanent or temporary impediment to removal exists, which would violate the principle of non-
refoulement or due to a suspensive interim measure has been ordered by the ECtHR, a TCN subject to a heavy entry ban 
(more than ten years) cannot be granted a right to legal stay in the Netherlands. According to the Dutch Council of State, 
such situations do not prevent the competent authorities from adopting a return decision. They prevent them from 
‘exercise[ing] their right of removal’, obliging the TCN to leave the territory for another country of destination. It might 
become problematic though in the case of non-compliance with the obligation to return, for which a subsequent removal 
decision could not be issued without indicating a specified country of return.  
177 CZ, SAC, 9 As 23/2009, 2009. Overall, there is a lack of relevant case-law regarding the ‘appropriate period’ of 
postponement to be defined by immigration authorities.  
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4. Article 10(2) RD: removal of unaccompanied minors  
Considered as ‘vulnerable persons’, whose special needs have to be taken into account,178 
unaccompanied minors (UM) receive particular attention from the Return Directive at various stages 
of the return procedure.
179
 During negotiations, the creation of one single provision entirely dedicated 
to unaccompanied minors has been actively promoted by the European Parliament.
180
 According to 
Article 10(2) RD,
181
 before removing an unaccompanied minor from a Member State’s territory, 
authorities of that Member State shall be satisfied that he or she will be returned: to a member of his or 
her family; a nominated guardian; or adequate reception facilities in the State of return. The provision 
is therefore based on the underlying understanding that, in principle, returning and removing an 
unaccompanied minor is admissible, but subject to specific conditions and guarantees to preserve the 
best interests of the child, in line with the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
Most, but not all participating Member States, provide for the possibility of removing 
unaccompanied minors. In France, Article L 511-4 CESEDA formally prohibits the expulsion of 
unaccompanied minors. The minor can eventually be detained and subsequently removed when he 
accompanies an adult, but that requires a strict assessment of their mutual relationship and prior 
identification. In Italy, according to Article 19(2) of the Consolidated Text on Immigration, expulsion 
is not permitted for unaccompanied minors. These automatically obtain a residence permit.
182
  
Among the national legislations dealing with the return and/or removal of unaccompanied minors 
(AT, BE, CZ, NL, CY), differences can be observed in terms of the ‘guarantee threshold’ and 
requirements to be satisfied before enforcing any decision. 
In Austria, the Aliens Police Act provides that, in cases of deportation, authorities have to make 
sure that the minor will be returned to a family member, a nominated guardian or to adequate 
reception facilities in the country of return. There is, however, little case law on the practical 
assessment of these requirements (except one case where the Federal Administrative Court validated 
the removal of a UM to a home for children in Russia).
183
  
In the Czech Republic, Article 119(9) ALA prescribes, during the course of the removal 
procedure, the appointment by the Aliens police of a guardian, a function performed by an authority 
for the social and legal protection of children. As regards the removal, Article 128(3) ALA states that 
the police must be sure that the minors will get reception ‘corresponding to their age’ in the country of 
destination. Unfortunately no relevant case law has been collected on this issue.  
                                                          
178 See notably Article 3(9) RD. 
179 Articles 10, 14 (1)(c)(d), 17 of the Return Directive. 
180 F. Lutz, The Negotiations on the Return Directive, p. 53. 
181 At an earlier stage, when deciding to issue a return decision in respect of an UM, assistance by appropriate bodies other 
than the authorities enforcing return shall be granted with due consideration being given to the best interests of the child. 
This clause must be considered as innovative. It provides for the first time a binding horizontal obligation under EU law 
to grant assistance to any unaccompanied third country national minor who is subject to a return procedure. 
182 That being said, in order to facilitate family reunion, in the case of unaccompanied minors, a process can be activated to 
verify whether it is possible to reunite him/her with their family. Only in case of positive result of an inquiry with the 
family, a procedure of assisted return will be carried out, within the framework of a personal program of reinsertion. This 
must be seen as a measure of protection of minors. In practice this is a marginal situation. From 2011 to 2014 only twenty 
minors have been included in a program of assisted return to be reunited with their family. See A. Di Pascale, Italian 
report, Article 10(2) RD.  
183 Overall there is no jurisprudence concerning unaccompanied minors, who are to be deported. Some decisions however 
refer to the situation in Russia, though the facts did not disclose a necessity to do so. The Federal Administrative Court 
stated for instance that returned minors who are unaccompanied could be accommodated in a children’s home in Russia. 
See U. Brandl, Austrian report on the first package of the Return Directive, Article 10(2) RD. 
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Yet the Dutch legislation elaborates further on the requirements for the adequate reception of 
unaccompanied minors in the country of destination. Interpreted as ‘every kind of reception regardless 
of its form, of which the circumstances are similar to those under which reception is provided to 
minors that are comparable to the unaccompanied minor who is to be returned’. The adequateness of 
reception is presumed by national authorities when:  
- a family member (up to the fourth degree) is present in the country of destination;  
- the spouse with whom the minor is married is present in the country of destination;  
- facts and circumstances show that any other family member or any other adult can provide the 
minor with adequate reception;  
- reception is provided by a (private) institution considered as ‘acceptable’ in light of local 
circumstances; 
- country of origin information warrants the conclusion that authorities of such countries take 
care of reception;  
- on the basis of general information, it appears that reception in the country of origin is 
‘available and adequate’.  
From the practical point of view, adequate reception is assumed when children can be provided 
with shelter, food, clothes, hygiene and if there is access to medical care and education.
184
 Note that 
when family members are present, authorities do not need to conduct further research or 
investigations. In a case concerning an Afghan UM to be returned to Iran, the Council of State 
considered for instance that adequate reception could be provided by the mother who, despite previous 
abuse committed against the child by an uncle who lived with them, had been able to help the minor 
flee from Iran without the uncle’s knowledge.185 
In Belgian Law, the regime established by Article 61 of the Law of 15 December 1980 provides for 
even further guarantees: when the unaccompanied minor is in irregular stay in Belgium, his/her 
guardian may request that the Aliens office (AO) grant the UM a residence permit. The AO then 
proceeds with an interview and an individual examination. ‘Removal’ is considered to be the 
appropriate ‘lasting solution’ only in certain circumstances. The unaccompanied minor shall be 
returned to his country of origin or to the country where he is authorised to stay or permitted to stay 
with reception guarantees and adequate care. These shall depend on his age and degree of autonomy, 
either by his parents or by other adults (family members or guardian) who will take care of him. 
Reception can also be ensured, under specific conditions, by governmental or non-governmental 
structures. This kind of lasting solution has to be proposed by the minor’s guardian and takes into 
account the best interests of the child. The AO shall then be satisfied when: there is no risk of human 
trafficking and when the family situation is likely to allow the reception of the minor; that return to 
parents or family members is desirable and ‘timely depending on the family’s ability to assist, educate 
and protect the child’; or when there is an adequate reception facility; and that it is on the best interests 
of the child to be placed in such centre.
186
 The Belgian authorities must, therefore, adopt a positive 
approach before removing a UM from the territory. They must, also, ensure that the minor will benefit 
from reception and care guarantees based on the needs identified by his/her age and degree of 
autonomy.  
                                                          
184 See Aliens Circulaire B.8/6.1. G. Cornelisse in cooperation with J. Bouwman, Dutch Report on the first package of the 
Return Directive.  
185 Dutch Council of State, 201202249/1/V4, 14 August 2013. 
186 According to the Belgian report, the first condition has to be combined with one of the two following conditions, 
depending on the factual circumstances, p. 11. 
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As illustrated by the case-law of the Council for Aliens law litigation (CALL), though limited to a 
review of legality, those requirements imply an individual and concrete assessment of the UM’s 
situation. The Council has ruled for instance that assumptions made by the AO are insufficient to 
determine an appropriate long-lasting solution for the UM. On the contrary, it must appear from the 
administrative file that active steps have been taken by the authorities: these have to ‘inquire about the 
reception and care guarantees’ or check the reality of such guarantees in the country where the minor 
is returned. In practical terms, family members must be able to welcome the minor. The sole fact that 
parents are still holders of parental authority and have maintained a ‘positive relationship’ with the 
minor does not suffice to formally motivate the choice of an appropriate lasting solution. Neither the 
fact that the minor is still in contact with his parents, or has parents still alive that are already in charge 
of his/her brothers and sisters, are considered sufficient to conclude the ‘adequateness’ of reception 
and care guarantees. The economic situation of the family or the health conditions of the minor are 
additional factors to consider when determining an appropriate lasting solution. In another decision, 
the CALL stressed that the concrete identification of the person responsible for welcoming and 
ensuring the reception of the minor is also part of the AO’s motivation. Finally, it has been stressed 
that both parties (e.g. the guardian and the AO) have to collaborate in this search for an appropriate 
lasting solution. If the guardian does not explain why the solution adopted by the AO is incorrect, it 
shows his or her lack of involvement. And this is a valid reason for the CALL to reject a request for 
annulment of a removal order issued by the AO.  
In Cyprus, a major role is given to the guardian, in charge of assisting the UM all through the 
return procedure.
187
 Before ordering a concrete removal to the country where the family members of 
the UM live, the Social Welfare Services asks the equivalent State authority of the country of 
destination or the international social service (ISS) – linking the various social services in different 
countries – whether the person welcoming the UM can be seen as a proper (legal) guardian. They also 
ask whether he or she can ‘receive, support and bring up’ the child. That being said, it is up to the 
SWS of the third country to determine whether the UM is placed in an appropriate reception facility 
upon return. In practice, serious and systematic failures still take place throughout the removal process 
of unaccompanied minors. In this regard, the Commissioner for rights of the child pointed to several 
legal and institutional gaps as regards UM’s who are neither asylum seekers, nor victims of 
trafficking. This is because of the lack of a specific legislative framework for children not covered by 
these categories.
188
  
Finally, in terms of procedural safeguards, Section 58(1)(a) of the German Residence Act provides 
for a deportation ban ‘as long as the immigration authorities have not ensured the concrete fact that a 
member of the minor’s family or another authorized person or institution will receive the minor’. 
Negative decisions can, however, be challenged by the minor and/or his representative, who may 
claim, for instance, that dreadful living conditions in the country of destination objectively impede the 
removal of the applicant.
189
  
 
                                                          
187 Before deciding to issue a return decision against an unaccompanied minor, the CIO seeks assistance from the Director of 
the Social Welfare Services (SWS): article 18PB of the Law of Cyprus provides that, a State agency taking due 
consideration of the best interests of the child, assists the unaccompanied minor and provides him or her with general 
information. While the concrete role assumed by the SWS in case of return is not expressly defined by law, when 
services consider that it is in the interest of the minor to return to his country of origin, the SWS is entitled to apply for 
guardianship, after consulting a multi-thematic committee. 
188 E.g., systematic detention, lack of coordination between competent authorities, failure to provide interpreters, legal 
advisors or even guardians, lack of proper information and documentation etc.  
189 German Federal Administrative Court, 10 C 13.12, 2013. 
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5. Article 11 – Entry bans190 
Article 11, §1 of the Return Directive is a case of legislation by reference to another provision, 
something which makes its interpretation difficult. It, indeed, requires the administration to apply 
entry bans if the obligation to return has not been complied with (a rather objective criteria) or if ‘no 
period for voluntary departure has been granted’. This refers to Article 7 (4) foreseeing that the 
administration may refrain from granting a period for voluntary departure or shorten it in three cases: 
risk of absconding; manifestly unfounded or fraudulent application for a legal stay; as well as risk to 
public policy, public security or national security.  
This means that the administration must automatically issue an entry ban when it refuses to give 
the third-country national the possibility of leaving the country voluntarily. Despite the fact that the 
purely automatic character of entry bans can hardly be considered compatible with respect for human 
rights for instance family and private life, there is no jurisprudence on this automatic character 
probably because litigation is about the return decision or removal order rather than the entry ban 
alone. One should notice that the Dutch Council of State considers that the administration can impose 
an entry ban, even if it leaves the third-country national the possibility of departing voluntarily.
191
 
The second indent of Article 11, §1 indicates that the administration has, for the rest, the possibility 
but not the duty of applying entry bans.  
Article 11 of the RD is not the only provision of EU law regarding entry bans that should be taken 
into consideration. There is also Article 24 of Regulation 1987/2006 on the Schengen Information 
System II (SIS II) that is about the cases within which Member States may or must issue alerts in the 
SIS for the purpose of refusal of entry or stay. The link to be established between those provisions is 
problematic. 
5.1 Jurisprudence in general 
The Redial database contains 90 cases on entry bans. One will notice in particular that there is a lot 
of case law in Austria, but none in Hungary and Spain.  
Case law focuses on the issue of the length of entry bans and the control that the judge exercises on 
the determination of the length of the entry ban by the administration. Those two questions are often 
mixed and are, therefore, addressed all together by the judge. 
It is also interesting to note that Article 11 of the Return Directive has been considered as having a 
direct effect in Austria.
192
 
5.2 Link with a return decision 
The Belgian Council for Aliens Law Litigation insists that the entry ban differs from the return 
decision and must, therefore, be the object of a separate motivation.
193
 The illegality of the entry ban 
does not necessarily entail the illegality of the return decision. The third-country national must also be 
heard before an entry ban is taken. The absence of this formality, however, will only lead to annulment 
                                                          
190 This Chapter (Article 11) was drafted by Philippe De Bruycker. 
191 NL, Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Council of State), 201302843/1/V3. 
192 See more details on this issue in the Austrian Report. 
193 BE, Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen (Council for Alien Law Litigation), 128.272, 27 August 2014. 
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to the extent that the outcome of the administrative procedure might have been different, following the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU in the case G & R.
194
 
5.3 Nature of entry bans 
The nature of entry bans has been elucidated by the French Constitutional Court. This court clearly 
decided it is about an administrative measure (‘mesure de police’) and not a criminal sanction. This 
issue has not been the object of case law in other Member States and does not seem to be 
controversial.
195
 
5.4 Type of entry bans 
Article 11 of the Return Directive distinguishes between mandatory and optional entry bans. 
Interestingly, the Netherlands made another distinction between what is called in administrative 
practice ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ entry bans. A heavy entry ban relates to the ‘dangerousness’ of the TCN, 
while light entry bans are all the other entry bans taken for another reason. This distinction is 
interesting because it has consequence regarding the power of the administration. 
5.5 Length of entry bans 
Article 11, paragraph 2 of the Return Directive foresees that ‘the length of the entry ban shall not in 
principle exceed five years’. It continues by saying that ‘It may however exceed five years if the 
third-country national represents a serious threat to public policy, public security or national security’.  
It is striking that there is no case law in Cyprus about the length of entry bans. Indeed, it appears 
that the old practice of imposing entry bans without indication of a time-limit persists.  
Some technical issues have been clarified by Courts. First of all, the Federal Administrative Court 
of Germany considered that the entry ban must be taken and its length determined simultaneously 
with the expulsion decision (meaning a return decision issued for criminal reasons). Following Article 
11 of the Return Directive, the entry ban should accompany the return decision. The Supreme 
Administrative Court of the Czech Republic considered that, in absence of specification, the starting 
point of the entry ban is the date of the legal force of the return (and not the date of the removal) 
decision. Note that this date was not fixed by the Directive.  
Regarding entry bans for reasons of public policy, public security or national security, a German 
ruling of the Federal Administrative Court of 18 September 2014 is particularly interesting. It 
considered that ten years is a maximum for entry bans because it constitutes the time horizon for 
which a prognosis can realistically be made. This, however, does not mean than an entry ban cannot be 
renewed or that a new entry ban cannot be taken depending on the circumstances.  
There is a doubt that Dutch legislation is in line with Article 11 as it allows entry bans up to ten 
years in cases that are not necessarily covered by the notion of a serious threat to ‘public policy, public 
security or national security’. Case-law does not, however, question its compatibility with Article 11 
of the Return Directive. 
For the rest, the question of the determination of the length of entry bans by the administration is 
closely linked to the issue of the depth of judicial control that can be exercised over this decision and it 
shall, therefore, be dealt with below. 
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5.6 Consequences of entry bans 
The geographical scope of entry bans should be clarified as it is not always clear that they are valid 
for the entire Schengen area.  
Apart from preventing re-entry in case of border checks, the Netherlands and Italy consider that 
re-entry despite an entry ban constitutes a criminal offence, beyond simple illegal entry. The CJEU has 
considered that such legislation is not contrary to the Return Directive in the Case Celaj of 1 October 
2015.
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5.7 Judicial control on entry bans 
Article 11, §2 states that ‘the length of the entry ban shall be determined with due regard to all 
relevant circumstances of the individual case’. This is the usual and general criteria that have to be 
applied by the administration when it has the power and not the obligation to apply an entry ban. The 
judge is there to control how the administration makes use of this discretionary power. This raises the 
classic question of relations between the administration and judicial authorities and the scope of 
judicial control. The debate on this issue can be intense. It can even lead to the adoption of legislative 
rules about the power of the administrative judge in reaction to the evolution of the jurisprudence like 
it has been the case in Germany (see below). 
The French report mentions that this is done by the administrative judge through the control of the 
motives of the decision in relation to the four criteria foreseen in the French legislation for the 
imposition of entry bans. The judge will also control the necessity of the entry ban and in particular 
respect of the right to private and family life. However, the French judge does not give rules about the 
adequate length of entry bans contrary to what the German judge tried to do (see below). In Spain, 
there is interestingly a case where the judge diminished the length of an entry ban.
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The German report signals that the Federal Administrative Court ruled on 2 February 2012 that: 
there is, for third-country nationals, a right to a comprehensive judicial control of the length of time 
for an entry ban; and that there is no longer administrative discretion here. This provoked the adoption 
by the German Parliament of a provision confirming the discretionary power of the administration 
regarding the length of entry bans. This includes the possibility for the administration to connect the 
determination of the duration of entry bans to substantive conditions like the existence or the absence 
of a criminal record. It will not lead to an absence of judicial control for administrative discretion, but 
to a control made on the basis of higher rules than German legislation, like constitutional and 
European Union law, including the principle of proportionality.  
The German Federal Administrative Court decided in a judgement of 13 December 2012 that this 
relies on a two-step reasoning:
198
 first, ascertaining the weight of the reasons underlying the expulsion 
decision; second, evaluating whether the duration of the entry ban is compatible with the right to private 
and family life which refers to the traditional balancing exercise, including the principle of 
proportionality. All circumstances of the individual case must be taken into consideration. The Belgian 
case law provides an interesting example with a case where an entry ban was annulled. The 
administration had not taken into consideration the care provided by the applicant to her ill aunt. Another 
example is the Austrian jurisprudence giving weight to the length of the stay in the country, say, ten 
years, even if the person only speaks basic German. Criteria used by administrative courts to determine 
the length of entry bans are: the attempt of the third-country national to prevent the obligation to return, 
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disregard for previous entry bans – leading to subsequent illegal stay – and the reimbursement of 
expenses for previous removals that are prescribed by German law. Case law in Belgium illustrates very 
well the requirement to take the right to family life and private life into consideration: for instance the 
integration in Belgium of the applicant and the schooling of his children. 
It is interesting to note that the Dutch Council of State has ruled that there is no balance of interests 
to be made by the administration when for a ‘light’ entry ban contrary to ‘heavy’ entry bans (see above 
regarding this distinction).
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Judicial control in Cyprus raises serious concerns. Any third-country national, who is returned for 
whatever reason, will be put on a ‘stop list’ that is actually an entry ban. This occurs often without 
time-limit but, in principle, for a maximum of five years. In a recent case of 25 June 2015 involving a 
Lebanese businessman challenging the entry ban imposed on him, the judge ruled that placing a 
person on the stop list is not a judicially reviewable act, save if the applicant can rebut the presumption 
of initial good faith on behalf of the authorities.
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RETURN DIRECTIVE: DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS 
RETURN 
 
Article 3(3)RD  
the process of a third-country national going back — whether in voluntary 
compliance with an obligation to return, or enforced — to: — his or her 
country of origin, or — a country of transit in accordance with Community 
or bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements, or another 
third country, to which the third-country national concerned voluntarily 
decides to return and in which he or she will be accepted.  
RETURN DECISION Article 3(4) RD and Article 6 RD
201
 
VOLUNTARY 
DEPARTURE 
 
Article 3(8) RD and Article 7 RD 
compliance with the obligation to return within the time-limit fixed for 
that purpose in the return decision (Article 3(8))  
Recital 10: Where there are no reasons to believe that this would 
undermine the purpose of a return procedure, voluntary departure should 
be preferred over forced return and a period for voluntary departure 
should be granted. 
REMOVAL 
 
Article 3(5) RD and Article 8 RD 
the enforcement of the obligation to return, namely the physical 
transportation out of the Member State 
1. Member States shall take all necessary measures to enforce the return 
decision if no period for voluntary departure has been granted […] or if the 
obligation to return has not been complied with within the period for 
voluntary departure granted […]. 
Clarification provided by the CJEU in Achughbabian:  
The expressions ‘measures’ and ‘coercive measures’ contained in Article 
8(1) and (4) of Directive 2008/115 refer to any intervention which leads, in 
an effective and proportionate manner, to the return of the person concerned.  
RISK TO PUBLIC 
POLICY 
 
Article 7(4) RD  
Clarification provided by the CJEU in Z.Zh. and O. case: 
Assessment on a case-by-case basis, whether the personal conduct of the 
TCN national concerned poses a genuine, present and sufficiently serious 
threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society, in addition to 
the perturbation of the social order which any infringement of the law 
involves. (paras. 50 and 60) Suspicion of having committed a criminal 
offence, or established criminal offence cannot, in themselves, ‘justify a 
finding that that national poses a risk to public policy within the meaning 
of Article 7(4) of Directive 2008/115.’ (para. 60) Other factors, such as the 
nature and seriousness of that act, the time which has elapsed since it was 
committed and any matter which relates to the reliability of the suspicion 
that the TCN concerned committed the alleged criminal offence is also 
relevant for a case-by-case assessment which has to be carried out in any 
case. 
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